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RHETORICAL FEDERALISM: THE VALUE OF
STATE-BASED DISSENT TO FEDERAL HEALTH
REFORM
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard*
This Article makes the affirmative casefor the widespreadtrend of
state resistance to the recently enacted, comprehensive federal health
reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
("ACA'). A significant number of states have engaged in variousforms
of objection to the new federal laws, includingfiling lawsuits againstthe
federal government, enacting laws providing that ACA will not apply to
residents of the state, and refusing to cooperate with implementing the
new laws. This Article identifies reasons why those actions should not be
disregardedsimply as Tea Party antics or election-year gamesmanship
but instead should be considered valuable to health care policymaking
andfederal-state relations. In making the casefor rhetoricalfederalism,
this Article examines and expands previously articulated theories,
including uncooperative federalism and opportunisticfederalism. Key
provisions of A CA implicating states are examined under the operative
theories.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article makes the affirmative case for the health reform
nullification movement. In so doing, the discussion develops a
conceptual theory of "rhetorical federalism" to encompass the range of
state reactions, and notable non-reactions, to the recently enacted Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA").1 By rhetorical federalism,
this Article means the highly public, highly vocal invocation of statesrights arguments to frame objections to comprehensive, sea-changing
federal policies. The theory is normative inasmuch as it finds value in
state-based resistance although not condoning all of the strategies
employed.
Values of rhetorical federalism include bringing transparency to the
task of implementing comprehensive laws, educating the electorate by
distilling the law to discrete issues, giving voice to minority views, depoliticizing highly charged issues, codifying dissent, and highlighting
the increased role of government in health care delivery.2 Rhetorical
federalism is inevitably, and I suggest appropriately, an amalgam of
slogans, some sincere and some opportunistic. Cooperative federalism,
dual sovereignty, new federalism, and traditional "Our Federalism"
themes all find voice in the current discussion. Even if some of the
rhetoric is empty, it has the potential to sharpen the debate and build
appreciation for the challenges of implementing major new policies,
while renewing deliberation about the appropriate role of states in
federal policymaking and government in individuals' lives.
State-centered dissent, such as refusing to implement new federal
legislation, challenging the constitutionality of federal laws, resisting
federal mandates, ignoring federal precedent, and even threatening to
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
2. See infra Part V.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss1/7

2

Leonard: Rhetorical Federalism: The Value State-Based Dissent to Federal H

2010]

RHETORICAL FEDERALISM

113

secede from the Union, would seem to hinder productive functioning
within the federal system. In response to ACA, states mounted resistance
through all of those means. In the view of many, state resistance is
legally null, at best, and destructive, at worst. This Article offers a
counter-view, suggesting that the rhetoric of federalism, even when
invoked inconsistently and opportunistically, may have a salutary effect
on both health care decisionmaking and federal-state relations.
The point here is not to argue the merits of particular provisions of
ACA or various state lawsuits, amendments, and resolutions. Rather, this
Article considers the potential benefits deriving from the apparently
distracting and obstructive health reform nullification trend. Part II
describes the current landscape of state resistance to ACA. Part III
considers plausible federalism theories to rationalize the state
nullification movement. Part IV outlines key provisions of ACA that
implicate states or have been targets of state objections and tests them
against the operative theories. Part V concludes by suggesting several
possible benefits of rhetorical federalism.
II.

BACKGROUND

I was among the health reform pessimists: Throughout the
protracted congressional debates and up until March 23, 2010, when
President Obama signed ACA into law, I predicted that incremental
changes, if any, would be enacted. Earlier versions of this Article
theorized that state constitutional amendments and legislative resolutions
purporting to nullify various provisions of the anticipated reforms would
provide a jumping off point for the inevitable next attempt at
comprehensive health reform. At least we would know going forward
that certain approaches-national health plan, public option, individual
health insurance mandate-would be political non-starters and could get
down to the business of hashing out the remaining viable options.
To my surprise, the bill passed. And state objections continued,
escalated, and morphed. During and after congressional debates, at least
forty states considered state constitutional amendments or legislative
resolutions purporting to nullify various provisions of the proposed law. 4
Seven states-Virginia, Idaho, Utah, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, and
Arizona-enacted resolutions establishing that citizens of their

3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. at 1024.
4. See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2010, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspxtabid=18906 (last updated Jan. 10,
2011) (summarizing thirty states' proposed constitutional amendments and over sixteen states'
proposed legislation).
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respective states would not be required to comply with the new federal
mandate that all individuals obtain health insurance.5 Missouri voters
approved a ballot measure prohibiting the federal or state government
from mandating that Missouri residents obtain health insurance or from
penalizing residents for directly paying their medical bills.6 Arizona and
Oklahoma held constitutional ballot questions in 2010 on amendments
purporting to nullify the individual insurance mandate. In addition to
state laws, Idaho's House and Senate passed a resolution calling for a
Twenty-eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution providing that
"Congress shall make no law requiring citizens of the United States to
enroll in, participate in or secure health care insurance or to penalize any
citizen who declines to purchase . . . health care insurance."

Many of the state nullification resolutions and amendments are
phrased in terms of individual rights, providing that citizens of the
respective states will not be required to participate in any particular
health plan. 9 Others recognize individuals' rights to purchase health care
directly from health care providers, rather than through health insurance
plans.10 Some earlier state resolutions and amendments objected to
universal health care, a national health plan, or a public option,"
vestiges of President Clinton's 1993 failed health reform effort, which
were never seriously considered in the current debates. Other resolutions
focus on the states' role in health reform implementation, prohibiting
state regulators and law enforcement officials from being required to
implement federal programs,12 or from punishing individuals,
employers, or providers who refuse to comply with federal mandates.' 3
5. See id
6. See Mark Trumbull, Missouri Voters Stage Revolt Against Obama Health-CareReform,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0804/
Missouri-voters-stage-revolt-against-Obama-health-care-reform (reporting that seventy percent of
voters approved the measure).
7. See Cauchi, supra note 4 (reporting that 55.4% of Arizonans and 64.73% of Oklahomans
voted to pass the proposed legislation). Florida's proposed constitutional amendment was scheduled
for vote on November 2, 2010, but was stricken from the ballot by the state supreme court as
misleading or unclear. See Bill Kaczor, FloridaJusticesNix Health CareAmendment, BLOOMBERG
Bus. WK. (Sept. 1, 2010, 8:10AM ET), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9HV
45JOO.htm.
8. Cauchi, supra note 4.
9. See id. at tbl. 1 (describing resolutions and amendments in several states, such as Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, and South Carolina).
10. See id. (listing Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
and Michigan among these states).
I1. See id. (describing such resolutions in the states of Alaska, Indiana, and Iowa).
12. See id. (listing Kentucky, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina among these
states).
13. See id. (listing proposed legislation that would preclude penalty in Louisiana, Maryland,
Virginia, and Wyoming).
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Some proposals codify states' rights to opt-out of federal health
reforms. 14 One California senator proposed a sweeping amendment
prohibiting state enforcement of a host of provisions, including the
individual mandate, employer mandate, public option, guaranteed issue,
and universal health care.' 5 Five states considered legislation objecting
to the fiscal impact of ACA, in particular, Medicaid expansion."6 In
addition to specific health reform nullification proposals, lawmakers in
forty-three states introduced general Tenth Amendment "reinvigoration"
amendments or resolutions, affirming states' constitutionally reserved
powers. 17
Within hours of the President's signing ACA into law, thirteen
states' attorneys general filed federal lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the law.' 8 Six additional states joined the lawsuits in
the subsequent weeks. 19 By June 2010, twenty states had joined the
suits. 2 0 By January 2011, more than half the states entered lawsuits
challenging ACA. 2 1 The first suit, filed by Virginia's Attorney
General,2 2 rests on Virginia's recently enacted statute providing that no
resident of the state "shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of
individual insurance coverage." 23 The lawsuit asserts standing based on
the state's sovereign interest in enforcing a validly enacted state law that
directly conflicts with the new federal law.24 On the merits, the suit
14. See id.(noting states that have proposed opt-out programs, including Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Oklahoma, and Utah).
15. See id.
16. See id. (listing Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and New Hampshire as "States
Opposing Health Reform Financing and Unfunded Mandates").
CENTER,
AMENDMENT
TENTH
Resolutions,
Amendment
10th
17. See
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/nullification/10th-amendment-resolutions/ (last visited Jan.
31, 2011).
18. See Complaint at 1-2, 4, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Florida Complaint], available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WFIMRAY-83TKWB/$file/HealthCareRefornLawsuit.pdf;
see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Virginia Complaint], available at
http://www.oag.state.va.us/PRESSRELEASES/Cuccinelli/Comm%20v.%20Sebelius%20-%20
Complaint%20filed%20with%2OCourt%20_323 10.pdf (an action by the state of Virginia against
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
19. See Melissa Nelson, Judge to Speed FederalHealth Care Challenge, PRESS & DAKOTAN
(Apr. 15, 2010, 12:08 AM CDT), http://www.yankton.net/articles/2010/04/15/news/doc4bc694aa9d
37al40784199.txt.
20. See Cauchi, supra note 4, at tbl.2.
21. See Kate Pickert, More Than Half of All States Now Suing Over Health Reform, TIME,
Jan. 20, 2011, available at http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2011/01/20/more-than-half-of-allstates-now-suing-over-health-reform/.
22. See Virginia Complaint, supra note 18, at 1.
23. Id. at 2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 2010)).
24. See id.
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alleges that the individual insurance mandate exceeds Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce.25 A second suit, initially filed by
Florida and nineteen additional states,2 6 also challenges the individual
mandate, as well as Medicaid expansion and health insurance
Exchanges, as encroachments on states' Tenth Amendment reserved
27
powers. Despite commentators' suggestions that the lawsuits are
"losers," 28 both the Virginia and Florida cases have survived the
government's motions to dismiss. 2 9 On January 31, 2011, District Judge
Roger Vinson granted the States' motion for summary judgment in the
Florida lawsuit, holding the individual mandate unconstitutional and
inseverable, effectively invalidating the entire ACA, although not
enjoining ongoing implementation or enforcement.
In addition to legislative and judicial fronts, states have registered
objection to ACA by refusing to assist the federal government in
implementing several provisions that specifically call for state
cooperation. Georgia's insurance commissioner and gubernatorial
candidate took the lead in informing Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, that he would not comply with the
Secretary's request to create a state high-risk insurance pool. 3 1
25. See id at 5-6.
26. See Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 1-2; see also Nelson, supra note 19 (noting that
six additional states ultimately joined the Florida suit).
27. See Florida Complaint, supranote 18, at 4-6.
28. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandatefor Health
Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482, 483 (2010); Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of
Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, J.L. MED. & ETHICs, Fall 2009, at 40, 42, 48; Sara
Rosenbaum, A "Customary and Necessary" Program-Medicaidand Health Reform, 362 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1952, 1954 (2010) ("The states' legal claims border on the frivolous. . . ."); Aziz
Huq, Bad Law, Smart Politics in Constitutional Challenges to Healthcare Reform, NATION (Apr.
15,
2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/bad-law-smart-politics-constitutional-challengeshealthcare-reform ("Even a cursory glance at the Florida and Virginia complaints reveals that
neither lawsuit really turns on a plausible reading of the law today."); Keith L. Martin, Law
Professor: Health Reform Lawsuits in Va. Other States 'A Loser,' INS. & FIN. ADVISOR (May 18,
2010), http://ifawebnews.com/2010/05/18/law-professor-health-reform-lawsuits-in-va-other-statesa-loser/. But see Randy E. Barnett, Can the Constitution Stop Health-CareReform?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 2010, at B2 (noting that the health care reform may be outside the bounds of Congress'
power); David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Illegal Health Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2009, at
Al 5 (arguing that Congress cannot impose a federal mandate that requires Americans to purchase
health insurance).
29. See Floridaex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d
1120, 1164-65 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607-08, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010) (same).
30. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (granting plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment) [hereinafter Florida Summary Judgment]. A copy of this opinion is available at
http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/viewlDistrict+Court+final+opinion.pdf
31. See Robbie Brown, Georgia Insurance Commissioner Balks at Request on New Health
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Subsequently, at least nineteen more states, with both Republican and
Democratic governors, similarly declined federal grants to establish
high-risk pools, leaving the job to the federal government.32 If states are
concerned about erosion of their reserved powers, it is difficult to
explain their apparent preference for federal intrusion on traditional state
authority over the business of insurance. 33
It is easy to dismiss those efforts as nothing more than political
theater, election-year gamesmanship, and Tea Party antics. The states'
lawsuits, asserting that the individual mandate is an unprecedented,
unconstitutional extension of federal commerce power, were generally
dismissed as meritless.3 4 Resolutions suggesting that federal law would
not apply within particular states' borders are null as a matter of the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 3 5 The likelihood of a federal
constitutional amendment overturning ACA is exceedingly unlikely.36
There is a long history of state nullification efforts in the nation's
history,3 7 including recent, similar efforts by states and localities
opposing the post-9/11 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (the
"PATRIOT Act"). 3 8 But notions of state-level armed resistance, 39a
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,2010, at A17.
32. See Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the
Tensions of Federalism, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2244, 2245 (2010); Jennifer Haberkorn, Party-Line
Split on High-Risk Pools, POLITICO (May 3, 2010, 4:38 AM EDT), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0510/36662.html.

33. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 661 (1995) ("[G]eneral health care regulation .. . historically has been a matter of local
concern."); infra Part IV.B (discussing high-risk insurance pools).
34. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1954 (noting that the legal claims are largely
frivolous). But see supranote 30 and accompanying text (describing states' successful constitutional
challenge in a Florida federal court).
35. Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 869,
869 (2010).
36. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23 (1998) (noting that the
Constitution has been amended less than once per decade, compared to states, which regularly
amend and revise their constitutions); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalismand the Domain
ofNormative Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 523, 527 (2000) ("The . .. key distinction between the
federal and state constitutions concerns the frequency of amendments over time."); Lawrence G.
Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 895 (1990) ("[T]he Constitution is
markedly obdurate to textual change.").
37. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism,74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304, 1306-07 & n.10
(1999) (citing various historical examples during the New Deal); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the
Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1277, 1283 & nn.18-19 (2004) (describing the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which protested
Congress' Alien and Sedition Acts).
38. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1253-57 (2004) (noting a movement against the PATRIOT Act in Madison,
Wisconsin); Young, supra note 37, at 1278, 1282-83, 1285-86 (describing the movement by states
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health care 'tariff of abominations,"' 4 0 or latter-day Orval FaubuS 4 1
figures seem laughable.4 2 Nevertheless, the nullification movement
continues to gather steam. Rather than dismiss the trend, its persistence
and pervasiveness warrants consideration. This Article identifies the
potential value to the national health care conversation and federal-state
relations deriving from the federalism objections being voiced by health
reform opponents.
III.

FEDERALISM THEORIES

To develop a concept of rhetorical federalism, this Part engages two
plausible working theories, borrowing the normative posture of one,
which suggests that state resistance to federal policies can be a good
thing, and the descriptive posture of another, observing that federalism
arguments may be mere proxies for substantive policy objections. The
normative theory, uncooperative federalism, posits that even when states
obstruct or refuse to cooperate with federal authorities, the contentious
interactive process may benefit policymaking.4 3 The descriptive theory,
opportunistic federalism, dismisses arguments invoking states' rights or
structure of government as disingenuous and simply means to other
ideological ends.4 Each theory begins to rationalize the array of state
responses to ACA, but neither provides a fully operative explanation for
the current health reform nullification movement. Rhetorical federalism
seconds the normative conclusion of uncooperative federalism that state-

in opposing the PATRIOT Act).
39. See, e.g., Sean Murphy & Tim Talley, Oklahoma Tea Parties,Lawmakers Envision AntiFederal Militia, TRIB.COM (Apr. 13, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://trib.com/news/national/article
3b9b65ba-b60c-507a-9c9e-f076a95bl649.html.
40. See John Yoo, Andrew Jackson and PresidentialPower, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 521,
563-72 (2008) (describing President Andrew Jackson's nullification and secession fight with South
Carolina over national tariff rates).
41.

See WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II

157-61 (3d ed. 1995) (describing Southern resistance to the school desegregation mandate in Brown
v. Board of Education, and the subsequent order of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus to block the
entrance to Little Rock's Central High School).
42. See Tim Jost, Firing Again on Fort Sumter, O'NEILL INST. FOR NAT'L & GLOBAL
HEALTH L. (Sept. 29, 2009, 7:35 AM), http://oneillhealthreform.wordpress.com/2009/09/29/firingagain-on-fort-sumpter/; Frank Pasquale, Parsing "Populism" in Resistance to Reform, HEALTH
REFORM WATCH (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/09/28/parsingpopulism-in-resistance-to-reform/.
43. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1286-91 (2009) (discussing the various ways that uncooperative federalism benefits
policymaking); infra Part III.A.
44. See Cross, supra note 37, at 1307 & n.12 (citing instances where federalism was used to
pursue other ideological ends); Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 131, 137 (2004); infra Part III.B.
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based dissent can be valuable, yet acknowledges the descriptive
accuracy of opportunistic federalism that some of the rhetoric may be
disingenuous.
Mindful of Larry Kramer's admonition, "Talking about federalism
feels a bit like joining the proverbial blind men trying to describe an
elephant. It's such a big topic, one can't possibly hope to grasp more
than a small part of the beast,"45 I offer a detailed case study of the role
of federalism in health care decisionmaking and aim to grasp only the
particular resonance of state resistance in the current health reform
conversation. Presidential administrations over the past century, again
and again, have attempted to enact meaningful, comprehensive health
care reform plans. 46 ACA represents "the most significant change in the
American health care system in a generation,"4 7 and the role of state
resistance in the passage and implementation of that law is notable. I
leave to future scholars to consider whether the insights that I develop in
the health reform context apply similarly to future significant legislative
events.
A. UncooperativeFederalism
Uncooperative federalism, a theory articulated by Jessica BulmanPozen and Heather Gerken,4 8 suggests that even when states actively
refuse to cooperate with the federal government, their resistance may be
beneficial. 49 To understand uncooperative federalism, it is helpful to
place the theory in the context of other federalism theories. BulmanPozen and Gerken offer the following matrix, which I slightly modify, in
their footnote 18.5o

45. Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1994).
46. See U.S. Health CareReform Interactive Timeline, NEW ENG. J. MED.: HEALTH POL'Y &
REFORM (Aug. 26, 2009), http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?pageid=1647.
47.

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENT TO HEALTH LAW:

CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 1 (6th ed. 2010).
48. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43 (describing the concept of
uncooperative federalism in theory and in practice, illustrating the advantages of this state-centered
dissent, and advocating for a strong commitment to this type of federalism).
49. See id. at 1286-91.
50. Seeid.at1264n.18.
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Table 1
STATES' ROLE
Rivals/challengers
Allies/friends

Power of the sovereign
1. State autonomy; dual

Power of the
servant
2. Uncooperative

sovereignty

federalism

3. Functional theory

4. Cooperative
federalism

The vertical axis represents the normative position of what states
should do: either they should serve as rivals or challengers to the federal
government, or they should serve as friends or allies with the federal
government. The horizontal axis identifies two strategies to facilitate
healthy federal-state relations: either the power of states as sovereigns,
or the power of states as servants. The authors note that most existing
scholarship falls in Box 1, the state autonomy or dual sovereignty view
of federal-state relations, or Box 4, the cooperative federalism view.
Their theory fills Box 2, the affirmative case for states as rivals and
challengers from the posture of servants.
For Box 3, Bulman-Pozen and Gerken suggest Roderick Hills's
"functional theory."52 Hills favors state autonomy not so that states can
operate as dual or separate sovereigns, but so that they can bargain
effectively for their role within a cooperative, integrated federal
regime.53 States, under their reserved powers, hold a property right to
refuse to lend state administrative processes to implement federal
policies, which right they can sell in a freely negotiated trade, like any
other private contractor.54 Cooperation is a good thing, but only when
the federal government "purchases" state services through voluntary
agreements.
Dual sovereignty or state autonomy, like uncooperative federalism,
urges states to rival and challenge the federal government but from the
Values associated with the dual
posture of sovereign powers.
51. Id.
52. See id.; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV.
813, 816-17 (1998) [hereinafter Hills, State Autonomy] (defining the functional theory generally);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 185
(1998) [hereinafter Hills, Federalism] ("[N]on-federal governments have the capacity to bargain
hard for more implementing discretion or more federal money, or both, when they enlist to
implement federal programs.").
53. See Hills, State Autonomy, supra note 52, at 817.
54. Id. at 822-23. Hills calls this property right "'the New York entitlement.' Id. at 822; see
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (articulating the anticommandering principle).
55. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views ofFederalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1229, 1236-37 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Five Views]; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
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sovereignty view include providing alternative, more accessible forums
for citizen participation in the political process. 56 In addition, different
territories may have different tastes and needs, especially on social
The diversity of approaches creates a "political
policy matters.
market," allowing citizenry a choice of "laws, customs, and attitudes,""
and ultimately, exit rights. 59 States also serve as laboratories of
democracy, experimenting and crafting solutions to problems, which
approaches can be borrowed by other states and the federal
government.60

and Federalism,96 YALE. L.J. 1425, 1492-93 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, OfSovereignty]; BulmanPozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1260-62; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 317, 330 (1997); Young, supranote 37, at 1297.
56. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 & n.18 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at local
levels of government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local problems have more ready
access to public officials . . . ."); Amar, Five Views, supra note 55, at 1234 ("[Flederalism operates
to edify and engage the citizenry."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L.
REv. 499, 527 (1995) ("[T]o the extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus
more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to
the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized."); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism
Jurisprudenceand National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 475, 511 (2002) ("[Federalism]
fosters governments that are more responsive than Congress to the needs of local citizens . . . .").
57. See Alan R. Weil & James R. Tallon, Jr., The States' Role in National Health Reform, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 690, 690 (2008) ("[S]tate policies can be more closely tailored to local
economic conditions and can reflect local values .... ).
58. Amar, Five Views, supra note 55, at 1237-38; Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's
Two Federalisms,83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 54 (2004) ("[T]he best way to please more of the people more
of the time is to offer a choice of regulatory regimes.").
59. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[Dual sovereignty] makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry."); Richard
A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism,55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 (1992) ("Federalism
works best where it is possible to vote with your feet."); Justin Long, Intermittent State
Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 41, 101 (2006) ("Diversity among the states also permits
mobile Americans to vote with their feet.").
60. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country."); Amar, Five Views, supra note 55, at 1233-34; Chemerinsky, supra note
56, at 528 ("A final argument that is frequently made for protecting federalism is that states can
serve as laboratories for experimentation."); James A. Gardner, The "States-As-Laboratories"
Metaphor in State ConstitutionalLaw, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 475, 486-87 (1996) (suggesting that the
states-as-laboratories approach produces potentially valuable information about policy altematives);
Grey, supra note 56, at 512 (recognizing Justice Brandeis' observation of the state as a laboratory);
Long, supra note 59, at 56 (summarizing the "laboratories of democracy" rationale for independent
judicial interpretation of state constitutions); Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Federalismand
Health Care Policy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 861, 868 ("[S]tates have amply demonstrated an ability to
come up with innovative new solutions and act as 'laboratories of democracy' in important social
policy areas like health care.").
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The dual sovereignty scholarship recognizes the value of dissent,
especially state-level dissent, within the federal system.61 Dissent
"contributes to the marketplace of ideas, engages electoral
minorities[,] . .. and facilitates self-expression."62 The Framers
envisioned friction, clashes, and jarring as part of the constitutional
design.6 3 States may act as lobbyists and litigants, challenging federal
policies and laws. 4 Objections may be voiced by states qua states, 65 or
by states as spokespersons for individuals.66
Cooperative federalism, by contrast, envisions the federal
government and states working together as partners to address common
problems or implement legislation.67 States serve as supportive allies,
freely and voluntarily, albeit often with strong encouragement,
implementing federal policies.68 Conditional spending programs,6 9 such
61.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 145 (2003) ("American

founders' largest contribution consisted in their design of a system that would ensure a place for
diverse views in government."); Friedman, supra note 55, at 403-04; James A. Gardner, State
Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State
Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1007 (2003); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1752-59 (2005) (discussing different regional ideologies in states); Matthew C.
Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiativesand Free Speech: The FirstAmendment as an
Instrument of Federalism,35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4 (1999) (noting that freedom of expression is a
vehicle upon which states check the power of the federal government); Young, supra note 37, at
1282-83 (discussing instances in which states have opposed federal policies).
62. Gerken, supra note 61, at 1749.
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[D]ifferences of opinion, and the jarring of parties ... often promote deliberation and
circumspection, and serve to check the excesses in the majority.").
64. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1988).
65. See, e.g., Porterfield, supra note 61, at 3-5 (noting that states have taken on issues innately
federal, such as foreign policy, in order to advocate their own views).
66. See Amar, OfSovereignty, supra note 55, at 1446 (noting that the Framers conceptualized
states as sovereign factions that could act on their own behalf or on the behalf of the state citizenry);
Young, supra note 37, at 1285-86 (arguing that states should act as intermediaries between the
people and the federal government).
67. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (describing the cooperative
federalism model); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590-91 (1937) (noting that taxation
by the federal government promotes both federal and state welfare); see also Bulman-Pozen &
Gerken, supra note 43, at 1262 (illustrating the integration component of cooperative federalism by
comparing the theory to a marble cake); Hills, State Autonomy, supra note 52, at 858-60
(exemplifying the concept of conditional grants, in which the federal government gives states
money to be used for the welfare of the state, as an example of cooperative federalism); Philip J.
Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv. 663,
668-70 (2001) (describing history and examples of cooperative federalism, beginning with New
Deal legislation).
68. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1550 (2007) ("[C]ooperative federalism
[programs] ... typically involve a federal statute that regulates a risk or addresses a social ill or
need ... [but] do not depend solely on federal actors for their implementation and enforcement.");
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as Medicaid, are prime examples of cooperative federalism. 70 Under its
spending power, Congress entices states to enact laws or implement
programs by conditioning federal funding on states' compliance with
broad federal requirements,n even though the federal government
cannot directly regulate states or "commandeer" state regulatory
authorities to implement, administer, or enforce federal programs.72
ACA employs several cooperative federalism strategies, including
conditional spending, conditional preemption, grants, and contracts, to
engage state cooperation in implementing the massive package of health
care reforms.
Uncooperative federalism focuses on the power that states wield
precisely because of their subservient posture vis-a-vis the federal
government.74 The theory emphasizes the "power of the servant" and
"the ways in which integration can serve as a distinct source of
strength."7 5 Lacking adequate financial resources or regulatory reach to
implement comprehensive programs, the federal government often
Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L.
REv. 1075, 1075 (1997) ("Congress frequently encourages states to become regulatory partners in
federal programs, sometimes by threatening to preempt the existing regulations of non-participating
states, and other times by rewarding participating states with substantial monetary subsidies.");
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (1983)
(using Medicaid as an example of states furthering federal policy); Joshua D. Samoff, Cooperative
Federalism,the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution,39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 213-14
(1997); Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism,23 IOWA L. REv. 459, 479-82 (1938) (describing
states' food and drug legislation as compared to federal legislation).
69. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (citing cases that exemplify use of the conditional
spending power); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1987) (conditioning federal
highway funds on states enacting laws limiting alcohol sales to minors and introducing limits on
conditional spending power); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (defining the concept of
conditional spending power); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (illustrating Congress'
power to lay and collect taxes); Weiser, supra note 67, at 705 (describing various cooperative
federalism schemes).
70. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) ("The Medicaid program ... is a
cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to
participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons.").
71. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 ("[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated
legislative fields' may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the
conditional grant of federal funds." (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 65)); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the
terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States.").
72. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) ("[T]he Federal Government may
not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs."); New York, 505 U.S. at 162 ("[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions.").
73. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1002,
1321, 1323(e), 1331, 9005, 124 Stat. 119, 138-39, 186-87, 196-200, 854-55 (2010).
74. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1263.
75. Id. at 1265.
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depends on states to implement and administer federal policies. 76
Because Congress cannot simply mandate states to administer federal
programs, it must offer carrots, such as conditional funding or block
grants, or sticks, such as conditional preemption or threats to usurp state
In so doing, the federal government cedes
implementation.
considerable power and discretion to states. For example, under
Medicaid, states must comply with broad federal requirements but
otherwise are free to tailor their state plans to meet their citizens'
particular needs, still receiving federal matching dollars for every state
dollar spent.7 8 Even though the federal government ultimately holds the
threat of revoking federal funds or taking over state programs, financial,
political, and practical realities may render that threat an empty one. 7 9
States' power as servants also derives from their integration into
federal program implementation. 80 State regulators and policymakers
have regular interaction with federal authorities in administering
complex, cooperative programs. State actors may develop subject-matter
specialization within certain areas, such as environmental or health
policy, which transcends federal and state lines of authority.81 A related
source of power derives from the fact that states serve two masters: the
federal government and their state constituents. 82 Voters' dissenting
views give states the political will and capital to challenge federal
policies.
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken conclude that uncooperative federalism
can be useful within a well-functioning federal system. 8 3 Friction
between the federal government and states fosters a rich dialogue,
clarifies accountability, and encourages political participation.84
Doctrinal implications of the uncooperative federalism theory suggest
that commandeering, which is considered unacceptably intrusive on state
autonomy to Box 1 adherents, perhaps should be allowed or encouraged
under Box 2 because it engenders dissent.ss Uncooperative federalism,
like state autonomy or dual sovereignty, prefers narrow preemption but
not because state power should be interpreted as broadly as possible but,
76.
77.
ETHics,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 1267.
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues, J.L. MED. &
Fall 2009, at 53, 56.
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 68, at 1346.
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1267.
See id. at 1268-69.
See id.
See id. at 1270.
See id at 1307.
See id at 1286-90.
See id at 1297.
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rather, as a way to create larger overlapping spheres of federal and state
regulatory authority thereby ensuring ongoing conflict and jarring.
The authors are equivocal on the value of conditional spending
programs like Medicaid in advancing the uncooperative federalism
thesis. 87 The amount of power that states wield as servants under
conditional spending schemes depends on how badly states need the
federal money. If states have no real choice but to accept the federal
funds, conditional spending essentially becomes commandeering,
sparking various forms of beneficial state resistance and dissent. But if
states can freely decline the federal government's offer or bargain for
additional terms, little meaningful dialogue remains. States that freely
opt-out of cooperative federalism programs have little reason to object,
while states that bargain effectively may have their objections
appeased.8

Bulman-Pozen and Gerken offer the beginnings of a working
theory and invite additional case studies and doctrinal articulation. 90
This Article engages that invitation in the context of federal health
reform, accepting the normative position but finding the descriptive, and
predictive, suggestions not entirely apt. ACA relies heavily on states to
implement various key components over the next several years and
maintain those structures and laws perpetually. As the uncooperative
federalism model predicts, states, in their posture as federal servants,
have objected to various provisions of new federal law. 9 ' But they have
been unable to wield much power. They also have passively accepted
provisions of the law that impose significant burdens and intrude deeply
on state terrain. At the same time, states invoke the rhetoric of
federalism to object to ACA provisions that barely implicate state power
or responsibility at all, 92 a response that seems to fall outside of the
uncooperative federalism model.
B.

OpportunisticFederalism

Another plausible explanation for state resistance to federal health
reform is opportunistic federalism, a view that comports with those who
dismiss the nullification movement as petty politics. Opportunistic
86. See id at 1304.
87. See id at 1300-02.
88. See id at 1300.
89. See id. at 1301.
90. See id at 1308-09.
91. See id. at 1271-72 (discussing the different types of dissent in which states may engage).
92. See Huq, supra note 28 (noting the different constitutional arguments advanced by the
states opposing the ACA).
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federalism is not a distinctly articulated theory but a theme observed by
various scholars.9 3 The idea is that opponents of particular policies
invoke federalism as the basis for their objections although, in reality,
they care very little about the structural allocation of power between
states and the federal government. Federalism arguments are mere
proxies for substantive objections to particular laws and policies.
Opportunistic invocation of federalism to advance political
positions has a long history in the United States, beginning with
southern states' resistance to abolition and, later, desegregation. 9 4 Frank
Cross maintains, "federalism is consistently (and I contend inherently)
employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other ideological
end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself."9 5 He observes this
trend among not only voters and politicians but also judges.9 6 Other
scholars focus on the role of courts as protectors of structural federalism
against opportunistic federalism by voters, special interest groups, and
politicians.9 7 Neal Devins observes that:
[T]he willingness of lawmakers and interest groups to manipulate
federalism in order to secure preferred substantive policies is the rule.
93. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Sanford Levinson, Twenty-Year Legacy of South Dakota v.
Dole: Dole Dialogue, 52 S.D. L. REV. 468, 487 (2007) ("[O]pportunistic embrace of federalism
when it is convenient to attaining one's substantive ends is quite different from a more general
commitment to federalism, where one would have to take the quite-often bitter with the onlysometimes sweet."); Tim Conlan, From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on
the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations, 66 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 663, 667 (2006) ("By opportunistic, I mean a system that allows-and often encouragesactors in the system to pursue their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or
collective consequences."); Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the
Kulturkampf: Why Federalism Is Not the Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 387, 400
(2008) ("There will certainly be opportunistic federalism-gamesmanship in framing arguments
about what level of jurisdiction to apply to a resource, where various positions are motivated by the
perception that one level of regulation-local, state, federal, or international-will as a practical
matter be more favorable to a particular desired overall result than another." (footnote omitted));
Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
InterurisdictionalGray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 598-600 (2007) (describing opportunistic
federalism in American history).
94. See Cross, supra note 37, at 1306 ("Federalism's role in American history as a stalking
horse for racism is infamous."); Devins, supra note 44, at 134 ("This pattern of shifting
constitutional positions on federalism runs throughout American history."); Ryan, supra note 93, at
598 ("Among the more famous examples of such federalism opportunism is the role reversal
between pro-slavery and abolitionist interests before and after the Civil War."); see also Cooper v.
Aaron, 351 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (rejecting Arkansas's contention that its governor and legislature were
not bound by desegregation mandates).
95. Cross, supra note 37, at 1307.
96. See id. at 1308-ll.
97. See Devins, supra note 44, at 137; John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs.
States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 121
(2004).
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Indeed, the historical record is so overwhelming that it is hard to
believe that a majority of informed voters would suspend their
personal policy preferences in order to reap the benefits of structural
federalism. 98
Given that federalism is undervalued in the political process, Devins
calls on courts to police structural federalism, 99 urging the Supreme
Court, in particular, to "ratchet up" its reinvigoration of federalism. 0o
John McGinnis and Ilya Somin agree that the political process fails
to protect federalism values. The problem, they contend, is not
necessarily that voters do not value federalism, but that elected
representatives are not politically motivated to protect structural
federalism.0 l "Elected officials invoke federalism when it comports
with their substantive policy preferences, but they otherwise do not care
about the federal-state balance." 1 0 2 McGinnis and Somin suggest that if
voters were knowledgeable and adequately informed about federalism
values they might, in certain cases, subordinate other policy preferences
in favor of preserving the structure of government. 10 3 But the system
breaks down because politicians, acting as agents for their voter
principals, "have systematic political interests that often cause them to
undermine federalism."1 0 4 Voters' "rational ignorance" of the "complex
issue" of structural federalism means that they will not push elected
representatives to protect those values. 105 McGinnis and Somin note:
Federalism is an abstract and complicated system compared to many
underlying public policy issues like drugs and education, which are
more concrete and more likely to engage the passions of citizens. Thus,
when a federalism issue becomes a matter of public controversy, it
almost always focuses on the specific policy question at hand than on
federalism more generally. 106
Because neither state nor federal officials stand to gain politically by
protecting federalism, courts must step in.' 07 The authors clarify from
the outset that they are agnostic on strong state versus strong federal
98. Devins, supra note 44, at 134.
99. Id. at 137.
100. Id. at 139.
101. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 97, at 103 (noting that politicians have their own
"systematic political interests").
102. Devins, supra note 44, at 137.
103. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 97, at 94-97 (discussing why the general citizenry
lacks fundamental knowledge about federalism-related issues).
104. Id at 103.
105. Id. at 90, 94-97.
106. Id. at 96.
107. See id. at 97.
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power; the federalism that they seek to protect is simply the
constitutional allocation of power. 0 8
Erin Ryan also describes the pervasiveness of opportunistic
federalism in judicial and political contexts but ultimately concludes that
concern for structural federalism is earnest. She asserts that "our
continued commitment to structural tension between local and national
authority must stem from a conviction that it confers important
architectural advantages" beyond federalism's historical origins or
political preferences. 109 But Ryan cautions us not to assume that
Americans necessarily or consistently place high importance on
federalism, describing numerous examples of opportunistic federalism,
beginning with the Louisiana Purchase.1 10 Ryan observes that federalism
"is inherently content-neutral with regard to substantive political issues"
and acknowledges other scholars' observations that political preferences
tend to trump governmental structure preferences.'' Despite strong
evidence of opportunistic federalism, Ryan maintains, for the sake of her
argument, that the electorate does, in fact, value federalism as a policyneutral, structural matter. 1 12 She then articulates a model of balanced
federalism for resolving inherent tension between federal and state
authority.H3
For the sake of comparison, I offer a normative-descriptive two-bytwo matrix similar to Bulman-Pozen and Gerken's,11 4 to place
opportunistic federalism within existing scholarship and identify the box
that rhetorical federalism fills:
Table 2
FEDERALISM
ARGUMENTS
Detrimental

Opportunistic

Earnest

1. Opportunistic
federalism

2. Nationalist
perspective; unitary
state

Beneficial

3. Rhetorical
federalism

4. Our federalism;
new federalism

108. See id. at 89-90.
109. Ryan, supra note 93, at 597.
110. Id. at 598.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 644-65.
114. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1264 n.18.
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The horizontal axis describes federalism arguments as either
opportunistic or earnest. The vertical axis represents the normative
position that such arguments are either detrimental or beneficial to
"healthy federal-state relations.""' Opportunistic federalism occupies
Box 1, representing the view that political invocation of federalism
arguments fails to protect structural values. I place rhetorical federalism
in Box 3 to express my conclusion that even disingenuous, politically
opportunistic arguments are potentially valuable to both federal-state
relations and health care decisionmaking. The rhetoric of federalism also
occupies Box 4, which represents earnest appeals to traditional values of
"'Our Federalism"' 1 l6 and more recent "new federalism" scholarship. 117
To complete the matrix, Box 2 represents the view that even earnest
appeals to federalism values may be detrimental, including the
nationalist perspective" 8 and proponents of a unitary system of
government.

119

Our Federalism expresses the Framers' constitutional design,
balancing centralized coordination at the national level, on the one hand,
and diffusion of power and respect for state sovereignty, on the other. 120
Ample scholarly literature, beginning with the Founding Fathers'
Federalist Papers, identifies the values of a federal system.121 Just as
horizontal division of power among the three branches of government
provides checks and diffuses power, so too does vertical division

115. Id.
116. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1971) (discussing the historic notions of American
federalism).
117. See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
118. See Amar, Five Views, supra note 55, at 1230-31 (describing nationalist perspective,
which views states as threats to constitutional liberty and favors stronger central government); Hills,
State Autonomy, supra note 52, at 831-32 (describing nationalistic theory).
119. See Daniel J. Elazar, Contrasting Unity and Federal Systems, 18 INT'L POL. SCI. REV.
237, 243-44 (1997) (describing and offering France and the United Kingdom as examples of unitary
states, identified by "efficient control of power").
120. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) ("It is incontestible [sic]
that the Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty."'); South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505, 531, 533 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("'If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny
of small decisions-in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit,
until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell."' (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §5-20, at 381 (2d. ed. 1988))); Hills, State Autonomy, supra
note 52, at 816 ("The national government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of
federal law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to federal power and a
corresponding reservoir of state power if federalism is to have any meaning at all.").
121. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.");
Young, supra note 57, at 59 (citing James Madison).
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between the federal government and the states.1 22 States retain vast
reserved powers and broad discretion to carry out policy objectives.12 3
The Framers recognized that states bear primary responsibility for
governance.124 Health, welfare, and safety fall squarely within states'
traditional reserved powers.125
States' reserved powers offer unique opportunities for states to
address social policy concerns. 126 The Constitution establishes a floor,
requiring states to recognize at least that level of protection to individual
rights. But states may exceed the federal floor and accord even greater
protection.12 7 Justice William Brennan, in a series of articles, expressly
122. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921-22; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Amar,
Five Views, supranote 55, at 1236 (citing Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 790 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)); Amar, OfSovereignty, supra
note 55, at 1439, 1443; Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 525; Gardner, supra note 61, at 1007;
Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1954).
123. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203-04 (1824) ("[P]ower remaining with the
States ... form[s] a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within
the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government . . . .").
124. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 319 (James Madison) (E. Bourne ed., 1947); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 113 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. Bourne ed., 1947); see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 56, at 525 ("The Framers envisioned that the vast majority of governance would be at the
state and local levels and that federal actions would be relatively rare and limited.").
125. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 581-82, 594 (1995); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) ("[T]he authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and
'health laws of every description[]' . . . relate to matters completely within its territory and which do
not by their necessary operation affect the people of other States.").
126.

See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION

113 (1988)

("[S]tate constitutions are important determinants of who gets what, when, and how in
America .... ); TARR, supra note 36, at 149 (describing states' early recognition of responsibility
for social welfare); Daniel Gordon, Superconstitutions Saving the Shunned: The State Constitutions
Masqueradingas Weaklings, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 965, 970 (1994) ("[S]tate constitutions serve as the
predominant source of protection for individual rights in the United States. . . ."); Paul W. Kahn,
State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 459, 464 (1996)
(observing that states have the opportunity to address fairness controversies not being resolved
satisfactorily at the federal level).
127. See Amar, Five Views, supra note 55, at 1244 ("[T]he federal Constitution ... establishes
a minimum baseline-a floor-that state judges must respect on penalty of reversal. But the floor
need not become a ceiling."); Buzbee, supra note 68, at 1555 ("[F]ederal floors retain the benefits of
multiple regulatory voices, protections, and diverse regulatory modalities."); Gardner, supra note
60, at 483 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Hans A.
Linde, Without "Due Process": UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 182 (1970)
(urging examination of civil rights claims arising under state constitutions before turning to federal
protections); Long, supra note 59, at 5 1 ("[S]tate courts are legally entitled to interpret their state
constitutions as more protective of liberty than the Federal Constitution."); Thomas G. Saylor,
Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged,
ProphylacticRule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 286-88 (2003) ('New judicial federalism'
generally refers . . .to the increased tendency of state courts to interpret state charters as sources of
rights independent of the Federal Constitution and interpretations of the United States Supreme
Court. . . .").
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urged that states could and should expand protection for individual
rights,12 8 continuing the Warren Court's more liberal civil rights
jurisprudence in the face of the Burger Court's retrenchment. 129 Justice
Brennan's suggestion is further articulated by "new federalism"l 30
scholars who "share[] the ultimate goal of creating in every state a
vigorous, independent body of state constitutional law.""' More
broadly, new federalism advocates reinvigorating states' rights and
shifting the balance of power back to state governments through judicial
and legislative channels.132 A recent revival of new federalism has been
associated with the Rehnquist Court.13 3 States have embraced new
federalism in a number of areas, recognizing broader free speech,
criminal procedure, public education, and abortion rights. 134 Erin Ryan
128. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 776-78
(1961); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival ofState Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548, 550 (1986); William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977).
129. See James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourseofState Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV.
761, 771 (1991) ("[T]he Burger Court slowed the expansion of constitutionally protected individual
rights begun by the Warren Court . . . ."); Kahn, supra note 126, at 464 ("[Justice Brennan] was
eager to preserve the judicial ideals of the 60s and 70s. State constitutionalism represented a kind of
forum shopping for liberals."); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1081, 1087 (1985) (recognizing the important role of federal
intervention in assisting states to preserve individual rights as per the Warren Court); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REv. 271, 271 (1998)
(describing Justice Brennan's "strategic effort ... to highlight the value of plumbing the states for
individual rights protections in the face of conservative retrenchment"); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity
and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 420 (1998) ("The renewed
interest in state constitutions was prompted by the desire to entrench and advance the
accomplishments of the Warren Court at a time when the federal judiciary was becoming hostile to
the expansion of certain claims of individual rights.").
130. See Gardner,supra note 129, at 771.
131. Id; see also Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147, 1159 (1993) (noting that state constitutionalism
should be free from U.S. constitutional law); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the
States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 390 (1980) (noting the tendency for state law
arguments to be undermined); Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial
Federalism," 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233, 233-35 (1989) (arguing for state
autonomy).
132. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052-53 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution,
31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7-8 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, CongressionalPower to Renew the Preclearance
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 177 (2005) ("As
part of [the new federalism] revolution, the Court has greatly restricted the ability of Congress to
pass laws regulating the conduct of the states under its enforcement powers granted in Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."); Jeffrey A. Modisett, Discovering the Impact of the "New
Federalism" on State Policy Makers: A State Attorney General'sPerspective, 32 IND. L. REV. 141,
141 (1998).
133. See Ryan, supra note 93, at 599-601; Young, supranote 58, at 6.
134. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. 261, 280-83 (1990) (recognizing that Missouri is
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notes that critics of the "New Federalism revival" dismiss it also as "an
opportunistic political ploy attempting substantive political objectives
under the unrelated guise of preserving constitutional federalism."' 35 In
other words, according to the Box 1 view, Box 4 arguments, whether
new or old, are likewise disingenuous and detrimental.
Federalism arguments pervade the health reform debate.
Opportunistic federalism provides a plausible explanation inasmuch as
much of the health reform opposition does not concern the allocation of
power between states and the federal government. But opportunistic
federalism is an overly blunt explanation for the current national
dialogue. After considering ACA objections more carefully, it is
apparent that opponents loudly, if selectively, do seem to care very
deeply about protecting structural values, aside from attacking the merits
of ACA or voicing ideological views on health care rights and
responsibilities.1 36 Moreover, the constant invocation of federalism
rhetoric in the health reform conversation suggests that federalism has
greater political salience than opportunistic federalism theories
suggest.13 7 Even if some of the rhetoric is empty, incoherent, or
inconsistent, nuanced issues of health care policymaking and federalstate relations are now placed "at the center of American political
life." 38 Accordingly, opportunistic federalism theories do not fully
account for the rhetorical value of federalism in the current debate.
To test the uncooperative federalism and opportunistic federalism
theories, I examine key provisions of ACA that either implicate states or
have been the object of states' health reform nullification efforts. The
provisions discussed in Part IV include Medicaid expansion, high-risk
insurance pools, Exchanges, health insurance market reforms, and the
individual health insurance mandate. Following each description, I
explain the limits of the operative theories to account for states'
resistance to, or acceptance of, those provisions.
IV.

ROLE OF STATES IN FEDERAL HEALTH REFORM

ACA is staggering in scope and length, addressing everything from
employer responsibility to offer health insurance,' 39 prohibition on
entitled to accord stronger protection to preservation of life than federal law by requiring clear and
convincing evidence to terminate life support).
135. Ryan, supranote 93, at 600.
136. See Huq, supra note 28 (noting the concern for "states[] and individual liberty" in the
state complaints against the ACA).
137. See id.
138. Bruce Ackerman, A GenerationofBetrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519, 1519 (1997).
139. See Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1003(a)-(c), 124
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preexisting condition exclusions in health insurance plans, 14 0 health care
provider reimbursement, 14 1 public health demonstration projects,142
expansion of federal health care programs,1 43 extension of dependent
child coverage,14 4 health information technology,14 5 break time for
nursing mothers,146 taxes on tanning salon customers,14 7 and restaurant
nutrition labeling, 14 8 to name just a few.
This Part describes ACA provisions relevant to the role of states in
health reform and states' reactions to the new law. My discussion begins
with Medicaid, a long-standing cooperative federalism program in which
all states participate but to which many are now objecting. Next, I
consider states' divergent reactions to two new requests for state
cooperation with federal authorities: high-risk insurance pools, which
many states have resisted, and health insurance Exchanges, to which
most, if not all, states seem amenable. I also consider states' notable lack
of objection to a host of new federal health insurance market regulations
that broadly preempt state authority and discretion. Finally, I observe
that states' loudest objections are directed at the individual health
insurance mandate, a new federal requirement that has very little impact
on state authority and discretion.
The survey of ACA provisions reveals that state resistance does not
follow a principled line or fit a single federalism theory. States balk at

Stat. 1029, 1033; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1511,
§ 18A, 124 Stat. 119, 252 (2010).
140. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 1201, §2704, 124 Stat. at 154-55.
141. See Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1105(a)-(d), 124 Stat. at 1047-49
(requiring Medicare market basket update); id. § 1109(a), 124 Stat. at 1051 (allocating payments to
qualifying hospitals); id. § 1202(a)-(b), 124 Stat. at 1052-53 (allocating payments to primary care
physicians); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §3401(a), 124 Stat. at 480-81 (requiring
basket updates for inpatient acute hospitals); id sec. 3023, § 1866D, 124 Stat. at 399-403 (creating a
bundled payment pilot project); id §3102(b), 124 Stat. at 416-17 (mandating geographic
adjustments to physician fee schedules).
142. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4201(a), 124 Stat. at 564 (allocating
community transformation grants); id. § 4201(b)(1) (providing grants to states, local health
departments, and Indian tribes to carry out public health programs); id. §4102(a), 124 Stat. at 550
(providing grants for oral health demonstration projects); id. §4206, 124 Stat. at 576-77
(establishing an individual wellness demonstration project); id. § 10408(aHc), 124 Stat. at 977-78
(establishing small employer worksite wellness programs).
143. See Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010 § I 101(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1036-37
(closing the Medicare Part D "donut hole"); id. § 1201(1), 124 Stat. at 1051 (allocating federal
funding for Medicaid expansion); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §2101(b) (requiring
states to maintain Children's Health Insurance Program ("CHIP") eligibility levels).
144. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §2714, 124 Stat. at 132.
145. Id sec. 1561, § 3021, 124 Stat. at 262-64.
146. Id §4207, 124 Stat. at 577-78.
147. Id. § 10907(b), 124 Stat. at 1020-21.
148. Id §4205, 124 Stat. at 573-76.
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voluntary programs, yet fail to exercise their exit rights. States walk both
sides of the line on new requests for cooperation, at times objecting
loudly to federal authorities' requests, and at times willingly assuming
the newly assigned responsibility. 14 9 States seem to tolerate expansive
federal preemption of traditional reserved powers, yet strenuously resist
federal attempts to restrict individual rights of their residents.150 Despite
the inconsistency, when states do object, federalism is the rallying
cry.15' The health reform debate has given new political salience to the
rhetoric, even if not the substance, of federalism.
A. MedicaidExpansion
Medicaid is a long-standing, classic example of cooperative
federalism that relies heavily on states to carry out federal policies.1 52
States have long participated in Medicaid, but several object to ACA's
new eligibility rules and administrative burdens on states. Medicaid is a
conditional spending program whereby Congress offers federal dollars to
states that agree to implement state Medicaid programs.153 The federal
Medicaid statute outlines broad eligibility, coverage, provider
enrollment, and procedural requirements. States that agree to implement
programs meeting those requirements receive a percentage-on-the-dollar
match from the federal government for every state dollar spent on the
approved program.15 4 States also receive federal matching dollars for
state spending on certain optional groups of beneficiaries and
services. 155 Financial contribution by both the states and the federal
government is the "cornerstone of Medicaid."'1 6 States are incentivized
149. See supra Part III (discussing two theories as to why states may object or assent to federal
authority).
150. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (noting the concern for individual rights in
the states' challenge to the ACA).
151. See supra Part IlI.B.
152. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supranote 28, at 1954.
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006) (describing federal appropriation of money to the states);
Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (1986) (describing Medicaid as a joint federal-state
partnership); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (same); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 308 (1980) ("Medicaid ... is a cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government
provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy
persons."); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 413, 419-20 (2008) (describing the state-federal
relationship under Medicaid); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 68, at 1346; Sara Rosenbaum et al.,
Public HealthInsurance Designfor Children: The Evolutionfrom Medicaidto SCHIP, I J. HEALTH
& BIOMED. L. 1, 7-8 (2004).

154. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Makingfor the Medicaid Program:A Challenge
to Federalism,51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 860-61 (1990) (providing a program overview).
155. See id. at 865-67.
156. Harris,448 U.S. at 308.
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to provide generous public benefits, receiving federal support for every
dollar spent, while the federal government shifts a portion of the funding

burden to states. 15 7
Medicaid is entirely voluntary; states do not have to participate and
could refuse federal dollars, establishing their own state indigent health
care programs or electing not to provide any medical assistance for lowincome individuals.15 Currently, all states have accepted the conditional
funding carrot and operate approved state Medicaid plans.159 The
constitutionality of cooperative federalism arrangements like Medicaid
is beyond any serious doubt as states retain the option of simply walking
away from the partnership and refusing federal dollars.16 0
ACA expands Medicaid by creating a new, categorically eligible
population, and lowering the income threshold for certain currently
eligible groups.161 Historically, Medicaid provided no coverage for lowincome adults unless they had eligible children or were elderly or
disabled.16 2 The new federal law extends Medicaid to all children,
parents, and childless adults who are not entitled to Medicare and have
family incomes up to 133% of federal poverty level ("FPL").163 States

157. See Kinney, supranote 154, at 860-61.
158. See id. at 860.
159. See Genevieve Kenney & Justin Yee, SCHIP at a Crossroads:Experiences to Date and
Challenges Ahead, 26 HEALTH AFF. 356, 356 (2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/26/2/356.full.pdf, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A
PRIMER 4 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7334-03.pdf. Notably, Arizona
did not participate in Medicaid until 1982. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 262
n.19 (1974) (noting that Arizona did not participate at the time of that decision).
160. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (explaining the
constitutional principles of conditional spending); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08
(1987) (discussing the limits of federal spending power); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the
terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States."); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
645-46 (1937) (upholding mandatory payroll tax to support Social Security as constitutional use of
congressional spending power); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590-93 (1937)
(discussing the constitutionality of the unemployment compensation law); see also Abbe Gluck, The
10th Amendment Question, Comment to Is the Health Care Law Unconstitutional?, ROOM FOR
DEBATE (Mar. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/is-thehealth-care-law-unconstitutional/ (emphasizing that Medicaid is a voluntary program and that states
are free to "drop the program entirely" if they do not wish to expand eligibility).
161. See Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1953.
162. See id. at 1952-53.
163. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a), 124 Stat.
119, 271-72 (2010); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1953 (citing Congressional Budget
Office estimates that new income calculation methods will effectively raise the threshold to 138%
of the FPL). Under 2010 standards, a family of three that earns $24,352.30 per year meets the 133%
FPL. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
2010 POVERTY GUIDELINES, available at https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidEligibility/downloads/
POVIOCombo.pdf.
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may expand their Medicaid programs as early as April 1, 2010, and must
cover newly eligible individuals by January 1, 2014.16 Also, beginning
January 1, 2014, Medicaid income eligibility for children expands from
the current 100% FPL to 133% FPL.165 All newly eligible individuals
must be guaranteed a benchmark plan that provides essential health
benefits, as defined in ACA.1 6 6 Medicaid currently covers sixty million
Americans.' 6 7 By 2014, sixteen million more people will be eligible.16 8
By 2020, 25% of the U.S. population will be covered by Medicaid,
making it the single largest payor of health care services in the
country.169 The expansion is estimated to cost $434 billion just in federal
dollars, not to mention state spending. 70
ACA places much of the funding onus for Medicaid expansion on
the federal government.' 7 ' Under traditional Medicaid, the Federal
Medicaid Assistance Percentage that states receive to match their state
Medicaid spending varies based on states' relative poverty levels, from
at least 50% up to almost 75%.172 Under the new law, the federal
government will bear a larger percentage of the cost for newly eligible
individuals. For the first three years, 2014 to 2016, the federal
government will pay 100% of the cost for "new eligible" individuals in
all states.17 3 Thereafter, the federal percentage phases down gradually,
from 95% in 2017, to 90% in 2020 and thereafter.174
164. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001 (a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. at 271.
165. Id. §2001(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 274.
166. Id. §2001(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 276-77.
167. Stephen A. Somers, Medicaid in 2010: A Year of Transformation, CTR. FOR HEALTH
CARE STRATEGIES (Jan. 2010), http://www.chcs.org/usrdoc/President%27sMessage_-January
2010.pdf; Controlling Costs of Medicaid(Kansas Public Radio broadcast May 10, 2010), available
at http://www.kansaspublicradio.org/newsstory.php?itemlD=21661.
168. See Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1952 (including Medicaid and CHIP); Controlling
Costs of Medicaid,supra note 167.
169. See Controlling Costs of Medicaid,supra note 167.
170. Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1952.
171. See JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATEBY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/Medicaid-Coverage-and-Spending-in-Health-Reform-

National-and-State-By-State-Results-for-Adults-at-or-Below-133-FPL.pdf (estimating that 95% of
new spending will be by the federal government).
172. See Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and
Aid to Needy Aged, Blind, or Disabled Persons, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,315, 62,315 & 62,316 tbl. (Nov.
27, 2009).
173. Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1201(1), 124 Stat.
1029, 1051; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a)(3)(B), 124
Stat. 119, 272 (2010).
174. See Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1954; MARTHA HEBERLEIN ET AL., KAISER COMM'N
ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, FINANCING NEW MEDICAID COVERAGE UNDER HEALTH
REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES 2 (2010), available at
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States also face additional administrative requirements under ACA
to coordinate Medicaid enrollment with other government and private
health insurance plans. A new federal condition of participation for
Medicaid requires states to establish Internet websites for patients to
enroll in Medicaid and the state Children's Health Insurance Program
("CHIP").17 If individuals are deemed ineligible for Medicaid or CHIP,
the website must screen for eligibility for premium assistance and
Exchange enrollment, using the same application form.1 76 The federal
government is responsible for creating the streamlined application
form,' 77 but states may develop alternative forms, as long as they meet
federal requirements. 1 With the aim of enlisting more providers to treat
the newly eligible population, ACA raises the Medicaid primary care
physician reimbursement rate to Medicare levels.17 9 The federal
government will bear the full cost of that payment increase for the first
two years,180 but there is no promise of federal funding thereafter.
Expansion of the Medicaid program is one of the central complaints
in the Florida lawsuit, which characterizes the legislation as "an
unprecedented encroachment on the sovereignty of the states."'"' The
suit acknowledges that Medicaid began as a voluntary partnership
between states and the federal government in which states could freely
participate or decline.18 2 After more than four decades of Medicaid's
existence, the Plaintiff States assert, the program has become
"customary and necessary for citizens throughout the United States." 8 1
Accordingly, the Plaintiff States claim that they no longer have any real
choice about participation, turning the program into "a compulsory topdown federal program" that exceeds federal enumerated powers and
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8072.pdf.
175. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 2201, § 1943(a)-(b), 124 Stat. at
289-91. CHIP is another cooperative federalism program, offering states federal block grants to
extend state health plans to children who otherwise exceed the income eligibility requirements for
Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (2006) (establishing the CHIP program). States also
must maintain current income eligibility levels for children in CHIP through September 30, 2019,
and receive a 23% increase in the federal CHIP match. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act §2101(a), 124 Stat. at 286.
176. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 2201, § 1943(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 28990.
177. Id. § 1413(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 233-34.
178. Id. § 1413(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 234.
179. See Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1202(a), 124
Stat. 1029, 1052-53.
180. Id. § 1202(b), 124 Stat. at 1053.
181. Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 4.
182. See id. at 9.
183. Id. at 5; see Rosenbaum,supra note 28, at 1954 (summarizing and critiquing arguments of
states challenging the ACA).
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intrudes on states' reserved powers. 84 Judge Vinson, while accepting
the states' challenge to the individual mandate, roundly rejected their
challenge to Medicaid expansion, noting "that state participation in the
Medicaid program under [ACA] is-as it always has beenvoluntary." 8 5
In addition to lawsuits, state objection to Medicaid expansion has
taken other forms. Legislation proposed in New Hampshire would have
prohibited expansion of the state Medicaid program unless the state
legislature approved, or the federal government funded the expansion.186
Four other states are considering similar bills resisting additional
financial burdens on states as a result of federal health care reforms. 8 7
In debates over the U.S. Senate health reform bill, Ben Nelson of
Nebraska agreed to sign the bill only in exchange for a special provision
providing 100% federal funding for Medicaid expansion exclusively for
his state.' 88 Although the so-called "Cornhusker compromise" was
struck from the final law, it evidences state resistance to cooperatively
funding the federal program.' 89 Several months after ACA's enactment,
Congress voted, in an emergency session, to provide additional federal
Medicaid funding for states through June 2011,190 but with no promise
of additional funding for ACA's Medicaid expansion.
The two plausible federalism theories fall short of explaining state
resistance to Medicaid expansion. For much of the Medicaid program's
history, it has fit the cooperative federalism model. In the current
climate, uncooperative federalism is descriptively accurate inasmuch as
states are balking at the new burdens. Given the deep level of state
integration with federal authorities in Medicaid administration,' 9' and
the federal government's dependence on states to operate the program,
uncooperative federalism predicts that states should wield considerable
power.192
184. Florida Complaint, supranote 18, at 5.
185. Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *19-20.
186. See Cauchi, supranote 4, at tbl. 1.
187. See id. (listing Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan).
188. See Lisa Mascaro, Health Care Compromise Gives Sweet Medicaid Deal to Nebraska,
LAS VEGAS SuN (Dec. 20, 2009, 9:22 PM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/dec/20/reidcompromise-gives-sweet-medicaid-deal-nebraska/.
189. See, e.g., id. (discussing Nebraska's resistance to the ACA).
190. See David Herszenhorn, Senate Vote Clears Way for Billions in Aid to States and School
Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A14; Carl Hulse, House Passes Bill to Aid States and Public
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A14; Lori Montgomery & Nick Anderson, Obama Signs
$26 Billion Jobs Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2010, at A12.
191. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1268-70 (describing the theory of integration).
192. See id at 1266; Rosenbaum, supra note 28, at 1953 (noting that a jointly funded Medicaid
program allows the federal government to defray a portion of the costs onto states).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss1/7

28

Leonard: Rhetorical Federalism: The Value State-Based Dissent to Federal H

2010]

RHETORICAL FEDERALISM

139

Yet states have failed to protest forcefully or productively, other
than filing lawsuits on dubious grounds.19 3 Objecting states have not
suggested any preferable alternative policy, other than demanding
increased federal funds. 194 No state has urged repeal of Medicaid or
seriously suggested that it will opt-out of Medicaid to protest the new
coverage and administrative requirements. Indeed, the essence of the
allegation in the Florida lawsuit was that states, as a practical matter,
simply cannot opt-out.' 95 That dynamic should provoke strong dissent
and productive dialogue.196 If states no longer have a real choice, the
federal-state partnership becomes more coercive than cooperative,' 9 7
nudging close to the commandeering line.' 98 Bulman-Pozen and Gerken
predict that if "states are so starved for federal funding that they cannot
afford to turn down a federal invitation to join a regulatory scheme" and
are "forced to implement a program they find distasteful,"' 99 that
"should push them to engage in variants of uncooperative federalism." 200
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken recognize that conditional spending
programs can cut both ways, depending on how desperate states are for
federal dollars. 20 1 In the Medicaid context, states' dependence on federal
funds has rallied their objection but also silenced their effective dissent.
As the issue stands, the federal government is not compelled to respond
to states or consider other ways of extending health insurance coverage
to low-income individuals.
Opportunistic federalism is also inapt to the Medicaid debate
because objecting states do, in fact, seem to care very much about
structural allocation of power. Opponents cite concerns about state
power, autonomy, and fiscal and administrative burdens-classic
federalism tensions.20 2 The Florida lawsuit alleges that Congress
exceeded its spending power and intruded on Tenth Amendment
193. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) (holding that states have no
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal law).
194. See supranotes 188-89 and accompanying text (describing the Nebraska compromise).
195. But see Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *20 (Judge Vinson concluding that
the states' assertion that "their participation is involuntary, and that they cannot exit the
program ... is contrary to the judicial findings in numerous other Medicaid cases").
196. See Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 10-11.
197. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
198. See Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 13 ("[Florida's Agency for Health Care
Administration ("AHCA")] and the other Florida agencies will be rendered arms of the federal
government, and AHCA employees will be conscripted and forced to administer what is now
essentially a federal Medicaid program. . . .").
199. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1300.
200. Id
201. See id. at 1300-01 (noting that state dissent, stemming from conditional spending
programs, may depend on the amount of power Congress has asserted under the doctrine).
202. See Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 4, 5, 14-15.
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reserved powers by effectively commandeering states to expand their
20
Medicaid programs.203 States do not object, in the main, to a government
health care program for the indigent or a cooperative federal-state
approach to covering those individuals. They, instead, suggest that the
cooperative, voluntary nature of the program has been fundamentally
altered by ACA's onerous new requirements.20 4 Their concerns, then,
are precisely about allocation of power within the federalist system and
not simply proxies for substantive policy objections.
B. High-Risk Pools
In addition to expanding the long-standing Medicaid cooperative
federalism arrangement, ACA seeks to enlist states in new cooperative
programs. The first new program involves establishing temporary highrisk insurance pools, dubbed the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance
Program.205 ACA requires the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, within ninety days of the law's enactment, to establish highrisk health insurance pools. 206 As an alternative to establishing a federal
high-risk pool, the statute allows the secretary to contract with states or
nonprofit organizations to carry out the requirement.207 At least twenty
states elected not to cooperate with the federal government in
establishing high-risk insurance pools, including strong vocal objections
from some states' lawmakers.2 08
The temporary high-risk pools are intended to operate as stop-gaps
until other provisions, namely the ban on pre-existing condition
exclusions, guaranteed issue and renewability, 20 9 and the Exchanges, 2 10
take effect on January 1, 2014, on which date the high-risk pools will
203. See id. at 16.
204. See id. at 14-15.
205. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1101(a), 124 Stat.
119, 141 (2010).
206. Id.
207. Id. § l101(b).
208. See Brown, supra note 31 (discussing Georgia's decision to object to the insurance plans);
Christy Hoppe, Gov. Rick Perry Says Texas Won't Run High-Risk Insurance Pool, DALL. MORNING
NEWS (May 1, 2010, 12:00 AM CDT), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/
texassouthwest/stories/DN-texhealthcare01 nat.ART.State.Edition2.139685.html; Julian Pecquet,
GOP Governors Opting Out of Health Reform Poolfor High-Risk Uninsured,THE HILL (May 1,
2010, 12:17 PM ET), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/95443-gop-govemors-opting-out-ofhealth-reform-risk-pool; Some Republican States Opting Out of High Risk Health InsurancePools,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 2, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/
2010/May/01/high-risk-health-insurance-pools-hhs.aspx (summarizing news reports from around
the country which discuss states' objections to the ACA's insurance provisions).
209. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 1201, §§ 2703-04, 124 Stat. at 15456.
210. Id. § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173-74.
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expire. 2 1 1 ACA requires qualified high-risk pools to provide health
insurance coverage without pre-existing condition exclusions and
comply with specified premium and out-of-pocket limits.212 United
States citizens with pre-existing conditions who have been uninsured for
six months are eligible for coverage through the temporary pools. 2 13
Under ACA, the secretary may establish the high-risk pools directly
or through contracts with eligible entities, including states or nonprofit
entities.214 States enter contracts with the secretary and receive federal
funding to establish and administer the pools. ACA's requirements
expressly preempt any state laws relating to qualified high-risk pools
under the statute. 2 15 Accordingly, states that already operate pre-ACA
high-risk pools could bring their existing programs into compliance with
ACA or operate two separate programs side-by-side.216 Alternatively, if
states decline to operate high-risk health insurance pools, the federal
government will establish and operate the pools. Congress appropriated
$5 billion for the purpose, 217 with state allotments ranging from $8
million to $761 million.2 18
Thirty states and the District of Columbia responded that they
would accept the federal funding and establish state high-risk pools. 2 19
Twenty states refused the funding, leaving the task to the federal
government. 220 States that refused expressed concern about inadequate
funding and unclear guidelines, fearing that the task would ultimately
devolve to an unfunded mandate. 22 1 The cooperative and uncooperative
states fell in roughly around party lines. 2 2 2 States with Democratic
211. Id. § 1101(a), 124 Stat. at 141.
212. Id. § 1101(c), 124 Stat. at 141-42.
213. Id. § 1101(d), 124 Stat. at 142.
214. Id. § 1101(b)(I)-(2), 124 Stat. at 142.
215. Id. § 1101(g)(5), 124 Stat. at 143.
216. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Sebelius Continues Work to
Implement Health Reform, Announces First Steps to Establish Temporary High Risk Pool Program
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/20100402b.html.
217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1101(g)(1), 124 Stat. at 143.
218. Robert Pear, States Decide on Running New Pools for Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2010, at A15.
219. States That Intend to Operate Their Own High Risk Pools, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS.
COMM'RS, http://naic.org/documents/indexhealthreform-high risk_poolslist-of states.pdf.
220. See Robert Pear, Insurance Pools Readied in Some States, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at
A17.
221. See Pear,supra note 218; see also Haberkom, supra note 32 ("[S]tates are concerned that
the $5 billion HHS has to implement the program will quickly run dry, leaving cash-strapped states
with another tab."); Hoppe, supra note 208 ("'As we've seen in federal education and stimulus
programs, the administration is again asking states to commit to a program without knowing the
rules of engagement.'" (quoting Governor Rick Perry of Texas)).
222. See Haberkorn, supranote 32 (noting Republican officials objecting to the ACA); Hoppe,
supra note 208 (recognizing that of fifteen states refusing to create the temporary insurance pools,
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governors generally agreed to operate the high-risk pools, while states
with Republican governors generally refused. But there were notable
exceptions.223 Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger chose to
accept $761 million annual federal funds rather than let the federal
government run California's high-risk pool. 2 24 But Wyoming's
Democratic Governor Dave Freudenthal turned down $8 million,
expressing concern that the federal funding would be insufficient. 22 5 The
political rhetoric is also mixed, with some suggesting that giving states
the option to operate their own pools was intended to appease
226
and others
Republican concerns about expansion of federal power,
suggesting that the state high-risk pools are 'the first step in the
federal takeover of the United States health care
recently enacted
27

system."'

2

As one of the first ACA provisions to take effect, state reaction to
the high-risk pools is ripe for consideration under the working
federalism theories. States that lined up as supportive allies to establish
state high-risk pools exemplify the cooperative federalism model. Those
states will receive federal grants in exchange for lending their
administrative capacity and expertise to the health reform effort. But
states that refused federal dollars, thereby allowing the federal
government to operate high-risk pools in their states, defy conventional
theories, especially if they are concerned about ceding power and
autonomy to the federal government. The mostly Republican state
governors who are unwilling to cooperate in implementing high-risk
pools also generally oppose federal health reform and expansion of
federal power to regulate health care.228 Yet they decline the opportunity
to retain state regulatory power, receive federal funding, and establish
their own state high-risk pools. The preference for a national response is
all the more curious considering that thirty-five states, including several

many had Republican governors); Some Republican States Opting Out of High Risk Health
Insurance Pools, supra note 208 (listing several Republican states who have chosen to opt-out of
the high-risk pools).
223. See Pecquet, supra note 208 (noting that five Republican states have opted to run their
own high-risk pools).
224. Pear, supra note 218 ("'The federal government has the right to force you into having a
health care plan."' (quoting Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California)).
225. Id.
226. See Noam N. Levey, States Resist Creating Pools to Help People Denied Health
Insurance, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/Ol/nation/la-nahealthcare-20100501.
227. See Pear, supra note 218 (quoting Georgia Insurance Commissioner and Republican
gubernatorial candidate John W. Oxendine).
228. See Levey, supra note 226.
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of the objecting states, already operate their own high-risk pools to
address similar concerns. 229
From an uncooperative federalism perspective, states' recalcitrance
makes some degree of sense. States that decline to operate high-risk
pools are using their power as potential servants to decline federal
dollars and refuse to lend a hand. If the federal government depends on
states to establish high-risk pools, the secretary may face considerable
administrative challenges establishing and operating high-risk pools in
the twenty states that have opted out. That should create a climate in
which the federal government is compelled to listen closely to dissenting
states' concerns and respond accordingly. 230 But if the federal
government can just as easily operate the high-risk pools on its own or
through contracts with nonprofit organizations, states' refusals may have
little impact.
The uncooperative federalism model further suggests that states
command power deriving from their integration with federal
authorities. 23 1 Health insurance regulation is deeply embedded in state
governance. States have a long history, since 1976, of operating highrisk pools and the involved tasks of designating eligibility requirements,
benefit packages, beneficiary cost sharing, and provider reimbursement
rates.232 Any federal high-risk insurance pools would necessarily engage
233
with and draw on state expertise and infrastructure.
Thus, states may
hold considerable power deriving from their experience in the area, even
if the federal government does not depend on them financially to
implement the high-risk pools.
If the uncooperative federalism theory is accurate, we should expect
states to use their power as potential servants. But, so far, that has not
been the case. States that have declined to establish state-based high-risk
pools offer no policy alternative or purposeful dialogue. It seems that
those states can simply decline federal dollars and leave the secretary to
figure out how to comply with the ACA's requirement, offering no
comment on the merits of the federal law. 2 34 As long as the federal
229. See Pear, supra note 220 (noting that states, including Alabama, Minnesota, and Texas,
have existing high-risk pools but will allow the federal government to run the new ACA high-risk
pools in their borders). Alabama and Texas are named plaintiffs on the Florida lawsuit. See Florida
Complaint, supra note 18, at 3.
230. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1266.
231. See id. at 1268-69.
232. See TANYA SCHWARTZ, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, STATE HIGHRISK POOLS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/8041.pdf.
233. See Jennings & Hayes, supra note 32, at 2245.
234. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1295-97 (noting that the commandeering
principle may lead states to engage in this type of dissent).
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government can establish and maintain twenty state high-risk insurance
pools, the states' refusals have little policy-forcing power. The dynamic,
instead, comports with Hills's functional theory (Box 3)235 as states are
exercising their "entitlement" to withhold state regulatory processes
from the federal government unless freely negotiated contractual
exchanges are entered.236
At first pass, state refusals to establish high-risk insurance pools
appear motivated by earnest, structural concerns, similar to their
concerns about Medicaid expansion. The fiscal and administrative
burdens, lack of clear guidance, and very short, ninety-day timeframe for
establishing the high-risk pools gives credence to states' objections. On
closer examination, however, the objections to state-based high-risk
pools ring untrue if states earnestly value autonomy and sovereign
power, suggesting that opportunistic federalism may be at work. Just as
conservative Justices underplayed federalism concerns in striking down
California's medical marijuana law,237 resisting states gloss over the
deep state autonomy implications of allowing federal authorities to
operate high-risk pools in their states. Federalism values are cast aside in
pursuit of other objectives, perhaps with the overarching goal of
undermining the entire legislation, piece by piece, as the opportunistic
federalism theory suggests. That characterization seems all the more apt
when compared to states' conspicuous non-objection to similar
cooperative arrangements under ACA, namely health insurance
Exchanges, considered next.
C. Exchanges
ACA also seeks to enlist state cooperation for new health insurance
marketplaces, or Exchanges. So far, states have not voiced strong
objections to the particularly onerous demands related to establishing
state-operated health insurance Exchanges by 2014.238 In contrast to the
high-risk pools-the responsibility for which is assigned first to the
federal government-which may then contract with states, responsibility
235. See supranotes 52-54 and accompanying text.
236. See Hills, State Autonomy, supra note 52, at 823 (identifying states' "New York
entitlement," or property rule of state regulatory machinery).
237. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 & n.29 (2005) (holding that Congress has the
authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate local cultivation of marijuana despite a
state law allowing intrastate use and production for medical purposes). Erin Ryan points to the
Court's decision in Gonzales as an example of judicial opportunistic federalism. See Ryan, supra
note 93, at 600-01.
238. But see Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 16 ("[B]y requiring [states] to establish
health insurance exchanges, [ACA] deprives them of their sovereignty and their right to a
republican form of govemment .... ).
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for the Exchanges is assigned first to states, with the federal government
as a backstop, should states fail to comply.
Health insurance Exchanges are ACA's attempt to address
historical flaws in the individual and small-group health insurance
markets. 23 9 Lacking the group purchasing power and risk-pooling
advantages of group coverage, individuals, small employers, and other
groups struggle to obtain affordable private health insurance on the open
market. Exchanges are intended to facilitate the availability, choice, and
purchase of health insurance for those consumers. 240 Exchanges
centralize information, allowing consumers to compare plans, and
facilitate use of tax credits or other subsidies to purchase health
insurance.241 Currently, three states, including Massachusetts, as part of
its comprehensive health reform in 2006,242 voluntarily operate statebased Exchanges.24 3
Both the House and Senate versions of the federal health reform bill
included Exchanges.24 4 But they differed in assigning primary
responsibility to the federal or state governments. The House Bill would
have created a National Health Insurance Exchange but would have
allowed states to opt-in and operate state-based Exchanges if they
demonstrated capacity to meet the federal requirements. 2 4 5 The Senate
Bill provided for state-based Exchanges, operated by state authorities or
nonprofit organizations.2 46
The Reconciliation Bill passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President took the Senate's approach. By January 1, 2014, each state
must establish American Health Benefit Exchanges and Small Business
Health Options Program Exchanges through which individuals and small
239. See Jon Kingsdale, Health Insurance Exchanges-Key Link in a Better-Value Chain, 362
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147, 2149 (2010) (noting that the ACA would be able to provide exchanges on
a national level, which is something that small employers have never been able to do).
240. See Jost, supra note 77, at 53; Kingsdale, supra note 239, at 2149; Amy Lischko,
Establishing a State-Level Exchange 8 (Mar. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/1003HEALTHSUMMITEXCHANGE.PDF.
241. Jost, supra note 77, at 53; Lischko, supra note 240, at 8.
242. See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Failure to Connect. The Massachusetts Plan for Individual
Health Insurance, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 1283, 1283, 1290-91 (2007) (describing the Massachusetts
health care reform, including the "Connector," that state's exchange).
243. Lischko, supra note 240, at 11-13 (describing exchanges in Massachusetts, Washington,
and Utah).
244.

See KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF MAJOR HEALTH CARE

REFORM PROPOSALS 1 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform
sbs full.pdf.
245. See America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 208(a)(b) (noting the requirements states must meet in order to operate their own exchanges).
246. See Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. §§ 3105(a), 3106(e)(l)-(2)
(2009).
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businesses with up to one hundred employees can purchase qualified
coverage. 47 Only U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who are not
incarcerated can purchase through the Exchanges.24 8 The Exchanges can
be established by a governmental agency or nonprofit entity in each
state.249 States may also form regional Exchanges in which two or more
states can enter into a health care compact. 2 50 The federal government
will provide funding to states to establish Exchanges within one year of
the law's enactment, until January 1, 2015.251
The federal government retains authority to establish the
certification criteria for the state-based Exchanges, while states are
responsible for the actual certification of plans and administration of the
Exchanges.2 52 The U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services will
establish the criteria for certification of insurance plans as "qualified
health plans." 253 States are responsible for rating each health plan
offered in an Exchange in accordance with federal standards and
certifying health plans as "qualified health plans."2 54 Plans that fail to
qualify may not be offered on the Exchanges.
The federal statute includes a detailed "essential health benefits
package,"25 5 which must be included in plans sold in the Exchanges.2 56
Essential health benefits at least include ambulatory patient services,
emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental
health and substance use disorder services, prescription drugs,
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services,
preventative and wellness services, chronic disease management, and
pediatric services including oral and vision care.257 States may require
additional health benefits but must defray the costs of additional
258
As an
coverage through payments directly to patients or insurers.
alternative to enrolling certain low-income individuals in the Exchanges,
247. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I11-148, § 1311(b)(1), 124
Stat. 119, 173 (2010). For the first two years, states can limit Exchange participation to employers
of fifty or fewer employees. Id. § 1304(b)(3); Planning and Establishment of State-Level Exchanges
Under Title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 45584, 45587, 45589
(Aug. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170).
248. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1312(f)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 184.
249. Id § 1311(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 176.
250. See id. § 1333(a), 124 Stat. at 206.
251. Id. § 1311 (a)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 173.
252. See id. § 1321(ayb), 124 Stat. at 186.
253. Id. § 1321(a)(1)(B).
254. See id. § 1311(d)(4)(A), (D), 124 Stat. at 176.
255. Id. § 1302(a), 124 Stat. at 163.
256. See id. § 1302(b), 124 Stat. at 163-65.
257. See id.
258. See id. § 1311(d)(3)(B)(i)-(ii), 124 Stat. at 176.
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states may establish "basic health program[s]" for non-elderly, nonMedicaid-qualified individuals.25 9
ACA also requires state Exchanges to comply with various
administrative requirements, defined by the secretary, including
marketing limitations, sufficient choice of providers, standardized plan
information and enrollment forms, and quality improvement
strategies.260 States must establish an Internet portal for providing
Exchange information, a rating system, and other quality data control
systems.2 6 1 States must also provide a toll-free telephone hotline to
respond to requests for assistance. 2 62 In addition, states must establish
procedures for enrolling individuals and determining eligibility for tax
credits. 2 6 3 When individuals submit an application to an Exchange,
states will be required to inform them of Medicaid and CHIP eligibility
requirements, screen for eligibility, and enroll those individuals in the
appropriate program, if any. 264 States also must certify to the federal
government when an individual is exempt from the individual mandate
to purchase health insurance.26 5 States are authorized to contract with
non-governmental entities to carry out Exchange-related administrative
responsibilities.2 66 If states fail to establish Exchanges the federal
government will step in, administering them directly or by contracting
with a nonprofit entity in the state.267
As described even briefly, it is apparent that the Exchanges impose
significant financial, administrative, and enforcement burdens on states.
According to one estimate, the initial Exchange start-up costs will be
$4.4 billion in the pre-implementation years, and cumulative
administrative costs will be $37.7 billion. 26 8 State-operated Exchanges
rely on states' expertise and experience in regulating commercial health

259. See id. § 1331(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 199.
260. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(A)-(B), (E)-(F), 124 Stat. at 174.
261. See generally id. § 131 l(d)(4), 124 Stat. at 176-77 (listing the minimum quality functions
an Exchange must provide).
262. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 176.
263. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(G), 124 Stat. at 177 (requiring states to establish and maintain an
electronic "calculator to determine the actual cost of coverage").
264. Id. § 1311 (d)(4)(F).
265. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(H).
266. See id. § 131 1(f)(3)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 179 (listing eligible entities with which a state
may contract).
267. Id. § 1321(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 186 (requiring the secretary to determine by January 1, 2013,
whether states will have Exchanges in place by the January 1, 2014 deadline).
268. See Andrea M. Sisko et al., NationalHealth Spending Projections: The EstimatedImpact
of Reform Through 2019, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1933, 1940 (2010), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/10/1933.full.pdf ("[T]he largest new role for state
oversight is the creation and operation of the health insurance exchanges.").
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insurance. 2 69 States retain some flexibility in operation and enforcement
of the Exchanges and related requirements. 27 0 The statute's provision of
federal funding to states and option of federal management ensure that
Exchanges do not run awry of the anti-commandeering doctrine,271 at
least for the first few years. But federal funding ceases in 2015.272 The
statute also contains a nominal opt-out provision.273 By contrast to the
high-risk pools, so far, only two states have indicated that they will
decline to cooperate.27 4
Like state-based high-risk insurance pools, state-based Exchanges
represent a concession to Republican lawmakers who resisted increasing
federal authority and favored retention of state control over health care
reform.275 The provisions operate from different baselines and employ
different cooperative federalism mechanisms. The high-risk pools
operate from the baseline that the federal government will operate them,
but the secretary can exercise conditional spending power, in the form of
grants, to engage state cooperation. The Exchanges operate from the
baseline that states are primarily responsible, but the secretary can
exercise conditional preemption by taking over nonexistent or
noncompliant state-based Exchanges.2 76 Despite their similarities, the
two provisions have drawn divergent responses from states.
Neither of the operative theories accounts for states' non-objection
to state Exchanges. The lack of dissent is notable, especially by contrast
to the strong resistance to state high-risk pools. The uncooperative
federalism model suggests that the soft opt-in-high-risk pools-would

269. See Jost, supra note 77, at 56.
270. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1321, 1332, 124 Stat. at 18687, 203-06 (allowing for state flexibility and innovation of the general provisions of the ACA).
271. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
272. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311 (a)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 173.
273. See id. § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186-87.
274. Minnesota and Alaska have refused federal funds to establish Exchanges. See Exec. Order
No. 10-12, 35 Minn. Reg. 394 (2010); Sarah Kliff & Jennifer Haberkorn, Alaska Turns Down Fed
Funds in Protest, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2010, 6:09 AM), http://www.politico.com!
politicopulse/10 I0/politicopulse345.html.
275. See Lori Robertson, Still on the Table?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM),
http://www.factcheck.org/2010/02/still-on-the-table/index.html (noting that Republican plans for
health care envisioned more state control); Paul Waldman, Republican Governors Push
Federalization of Health Insurance, THE AM. PROSPECT (May 4, 2010, 3:45 PM),
http://www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/tapped-archive?month=05&year-20 I0&base name=republica
ngovernorspush-fede (noting Republican outcry of the health care law and suggesting that
Republicans allow the federal government to set up Exchanges in Republican states in order to
avoid any blame if plans go awry).
276. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(c)-(e), 124 Stat. at 186-87
(discussing the federal government's role where states do not establish Exchanges, or, in the
alternative, require assistance in the implementation of the federal requirements).
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trigger milder reaction than the hard opt-out-Exchanges.27 7 If states can
easily, without consequences, walk away from a federal program with
which they disagree, "they may not have much incentive to devote the
resources needed to mount an effective challenge to federal policy." 278
Yet, twenty states spurned the secretary's invitation to establish state
high-risk pools while, so far,279 only two have expressed unwillingness
to establish an Exchange,2 so precisely the opposite of uncooperative
federalism's prediction.
States' incongruous response to two similar cooperative federalism
arrangements under ACA comports with opportunistic federalism.
Health reform opponents invoke federalism arguments when it is to their
advantage but look past those concerns when other policy objectives
predominate. 2 8 1 At this time, it is hard to say whether states' nonobjection to the Exchanges evidences earnest preference for state
autonomy or opportunistic use of federalism arguments to advance other
objectives. If states are earnestly concerned about retaining state power,
it seems that they should prefer state implementation of both high-risk
pools and Exchanges. Although a significant number of states have
opted for federal high-risk pools, most seem to prefer state-based
Exchanges. 2 82 Indeed, during congressional debates, state-based
Exchanges won over a national Exchange, 2 83 in part, because of
concerns about the expansion of federal power. If states maintain their
support for state-based Exchanges, there may be nothing opportunistic
about it. Lack of opposition may demonstrate the real salience of
structural values, not merely as a rhetorical device but as a substantive
policy preference.
277. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1291 ("Forcing state officials to
participate in a federal scheme they oppose may generate more allies . . .
278. Id.
279. See Some Republican States Opting Out ofHigh Risk Health Insurance Pools, supra note
208.
280. See Kliff & Haberkorn, supra note 274 (noting that Minnesota and Alaska turned down
federal assistance to set up an Exchange).
281. See Devins, supra note 44, at 134.
282. See David S. Hilzenrath, 18 States Decline to Run "High-Risk" Insurance Pools, WASH.
POST, May 4, 2010, at A2 (noting that eighteen states have refused to set up their own high-risk
insurance pools, leaving the job to the federal government, while twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia are taking on the job themselves).
283. See Kingsdale, supra note 239, at 2147 (noting that exchanges have become the "primary
responsibility" of the states); Janet Adamy & Laura Meckler, Support Grows for U.S. Health
Exchange, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2010, at A2 (describing the White House's push for national health
insurance exchange); Peter Grier, Health Care Reform Bill 101: What's a Health "Exchange"?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 20, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.csmonitor.conIUSA/Politics/
2010/0320/Health-care-reform-bill-I101-What-s-a-health-exchange (noting national exchange bill "is
gone with the wind").
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It is also possible that states' vocal concerns about the costs and
other burdens associated with establishing Exchanges will mount as the
2014 implementation date approaches. States' current focus on high-risk
pools might be explained by the short, ninety-day time frame for
compliance, with similar objections to state-based Exchanges yet to
come. States may be engaged in strategic, if not opportunistic,
federalism, staging challenges to ACA as each provision rolls out.
D. Insurance Market Regulations
States also have not objected to ACA's significant reallocation of
power to regulate the health insurance market from the states to the
federal government. Several provisions broadly preempt states'
traditional authority over commercial health insurance companies
operating in their borders.284 Some of the new federal health insurance
regulations took effect almost immediately after ACA's enactment,
beginning with the high-risk pools in June 20 10.285 Within six months of
the statute's enactment, insurers were required to allow dependent
children to remain on their parents' policies until age 26.286 Effective
January 1, 2010, ACA created mandatory, nationwide medical-loss
ratios, meaning that large insurers are required to spend 85% of revenue
on patient care and no more than 15% on non-medical, administrative
expenditures. 28 7 The medical-loss ratio for individual and small group
policies is 80 to 20.288
More sweeping changes take effect on January 1, 2014. Insurers
across the country will be prohibited from excluding individuals on the
basis of pre-existing conditions,289 exceeding annual caps on patient
cost-sharing, 290 and rescinding coverage after individuals become ill. 2 9 1
Guaranteed issue and renewability also take effect in 2014,292 meaning
that insurers will be required to accept everyone who applies for
coverage and cannot refuse to renew policies based on health status,
utilization of services, or other factors. All new individual and small284. See Jennings & Hayes, supra note 32, at 2244-45 (noting that the ACA establishes new
federal standards for insurance policies which all states must meet).
285. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1101(a), 124
Stat. 119, 141 (2010) (requiring the federal government to establish temporary high-risk pools
within ninety days of the ACA's enactment).
286. Id. sec. 1001, §2714(a), 124 Stat. at 132.
287. See id. sec. 10101, § 2718(b)(1)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 886.
288. See id. sec. 10101, § 2718(b)(1)(A)(ii).
289. Id sec. 1201, § 2704(a), 124 Stat. at 154.
290. Id. sec. 1001, § 2711 (a)(2), 124 Stat. at 131.
291. Id. sec. 1001, § 2712.
292. Id sec. 1201, §§ 2702-03, 124 Stat. at 156.
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group health insurance policies offered through the Exchanges will be
required to cover an essential benefits package 293 and comply with one
of four benefit categories (platinum, gold, silver, and bronze).29 4 Insurers
will continue to be licensed and regulated by the states, 295 but any state
insurance laws will have to accord with the new federal laws. 29 6
In 2014, insurers will also be restricted in plan pricing. The statute
establishes nationwide modified community rating and specified rating
bands. Insurers may not vary premium rates except based on age (limited
to a three-to-one ratio), premium rating area, family composition, and
tobacco use (limited to a 1.5-to-i ratio) in the individual and smallgroup markets and the Exchanges. 2 97 States are required to establish
rating areas in compliance with the federal law. 2 9 8 Waiting periods
cannot exceed ninety days. 2 99 The statute also limits beneficiary costsharing obligations. Deductibles in the individual and small-group
markets are capped at $2000 for individuals and $4000 for families.300 In
addition, new, standardized administrative and reporting requirements
apply to all qualified plans.
ACA's new federal health insurance rules apply uniformly across
the country with no state opt-out. As a matter of federal supremacy,
states cannot adopt requirements that conflict with or impede the
purpose of the federal law. 30 1 Beginning on the effective date of each
provision, any state law that does not meet the minimum federal
standard will be preempted. States retain flexibility to adopt laws that
provide greater protection to health insurance consumers, above the
federal minimum, but cannot vary the requirements below that floor.3 02
Insurance market reforms in the federal legislation generally have
received broad support from citizens and politicians.303 From a states'
293. See id. § 1302(a)-(b), 124 Stat. at 163-65.
294. See id. § 1302(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 167.
295. Id. § 1301(a)(1)(C)(i), 124 Stat. at 162.
296. See Jennings & Hayes, supra note 32, at 2244-45 (noting that the ACA sets minimum
federal standards for insurers to meet).
297. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 1201, §2701(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 155.
298. Id. sec. 1201, §2701(a)(2).
299. Id. sec. 1201, §2708, 124 Stat. at 161.
300. Id. § 1302(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 166.
301. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) ("States have no
power .. .to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional
laws. . . .").
302. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(d), 124 Stat. at 187 ("Nothing in
this title shall be construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the application of the
provisions of this title."); Jennings & Hayes, supra note 32, at 2244 ("[The] ACA establishes new
minimum federal standards for insurance policies. . . .").
303.

See generally KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,

KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL (2010),

available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8042-F.pdf (tracking support for particular
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rights perspective, however, those new federal laws significantly intrude
on states' authority and discretion to regulate private health insurers.
Insurance regulation was long considered within core state police
powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. In
1945, Congress reaffirmed the states' authority to regulate insurance
with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,304 which effectively reversed a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion applying federal antitrust laws to the business of
insurance.305 The McCarran-Ferguson Act allows the federal
government to regulate insurance only to the extent that states have not
done So. 30 6 Congress considered legislation to repeal the McCarranFerguson Act, 3 07 but the repeal was not included in ACA. If the
exemption were repealed, the federal government would gain substantial
regulatory authority over insurers, further narrowing the space for state
regulation.
In earlier legislation, Congress has exercised its preemptive powers
over state regulation of health insurance. Most notably, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 308 enacted under
federal commerce power, broadly preempts state laws that "relate to"
employee benefit plans, including most employer health plans. 30 9 ERISA
also contains a generous savings clause that retains state authority over
traditional insurance plans purchased by employers on behalf of their
employees. 3 1 A separate ERISA provision preempts a host of state
common law remedies for plan enrollees aggrieved or injured by health
insurers' coverage decisions and administrative errors. 3 1 1 ERISA is

provisions, including guaranteed issue); Doug Trapp, Health Reform Provisions Poll Well, Even if
Bills Do Not, AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/
03/22/gvsb0322.htm ("More than three-quarters of Americans are in favor of reforming health
insurance, including ending lifetime benefit limits and exclusions based on preexisting
conditions.
304. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006).
305. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), superseded by statute,
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15; Jost, supra note 77, at 55.
306. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .").
307. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 11Ith Cong. (2010);
Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, H.R. 4626, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing an
amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act); White House Supports Repeal of McCarran-Ferguson
Act, ST. Louts U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y (Feb. 24, 2010), http://lawblogs.slu.edu/2010/02/whitehouse-supports-repeal-of-mccarran-ferguson-act/.
308. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
309. Id. § 1144(a).
310. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); id. § 1132(b).
311. See id. § 1132(a) (listing persons who may bring a civil action).
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widely considered a major obstacle to comprehensive state health

reform.3 12
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA") 13 also preempts state law by establishing national
standards for group health plans. HIPAA restricts insurers' use of
preexisting condition exclusions for individuals who move between
employer group plans or other "creditable" coverage.3 14 The law also
requires guaranteed issue for individuals with creditable coverage, 315
although it does not limit the premium amounts that insurers may
charge. State laws that do not meet the minimum federal requirements of
HIPAA are preempted. ACA, in effect, extends HIPAA protections to
the individual and small group market, and others with gaps in health
insurance coverage or no prior "creditable" coverage.
ERISA and HIPAA notwithstanding, the federal government has
largely refrained from substantively regulating the terms of health
insurance plans or practices of health insurance companies, leaving those
matters to state law. 3 16 States have implemented various requirements on
health insurance plans, including coverage mandates, affordability
requirements, insurance mandates, 3 17 marketing restrictions, and
grievance and appeals rights. State laws focus particular regulatory
attention on the small-group and individual markets, which tend to
impose greater obstacles to coverage than the employer and large-group
market. The number and specificity of the new ACA rules, especially
those targeting the same markets that states currently regulate, represent
a significant reallocation of authority from states to the federal
government. With ACA, state policymaking discretion and, accordingly,
insurance plan variability, is much more limited. But states generally
have not expressed dissent over that loss of power, even to requirements
that take effect almost immediately. Rather, states are actively preparing

312. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health
Care Access for the Uninsured,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255, 299 (1990); Peter D. Jacobson, The
Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Fall
2009, at 88, 88 ("Any comprehensive state-level health reform legislation or federal legislation that
relies on state activity must take into account the states' vulnerability to ERISA preemption.").
313. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
314. See 29 U.S.C.§ 1181(a).
315. See id. § 1182(a).
316. But see, e.g., id. §§ 185(a)(1), 1l85a(a) (listing very few federal coverage requirements
under ERISA, including minimum hospital stays after childbirth and mental health parity).
317. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, Health Care Reform in Massachusetts-Expanding
Coverage, Escalating Costs, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2757, 2759 (2008) (discussing the health care
reform in Massachusetts).
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for implementation by surveying existing legal authority and state
resources to enforce the new federal standards.
Squaring states' apparent tolerance for federal preemption of
insurance regulation with the uncooperative federalism model turns on
the scope of the preemptive effect. If federal preemption is read
narrowly, then the insurance market reforms fit fairly well under the
model. Uncooperative federalism encourages overlap and friction
between spheres of state and federal authority as a means to foster
productive dissent." 9 With ACA, the federal government reclaimed
considerable insurance regulatory authority. If states are allowed space
to adopt different policies and approaches, outside of the specific federal
requirements, that tension may lead to useful, alternative approaches and
testing of new laws. But if federal preemption of state regulation of
health insurance is read broadly, states will be pushed to the margins
with little room to object, silencing any productive dialogue.3 20 Until
states begin to test the scope of their residual authority to regulate health
insurance under ACA, it is difficult to fully consider the descriptive
accuracy of the uncooperative federalism model.
There is, however, reason to doubt the model's predictions.
Evidence can be drawn from states' reactions to existing federal
insurance regulation under ERISA and HIPAA. ERISA has been
interpreted to broadly preempt state regulation of employer health plans,
including a wide swath of traditional common law tort and contract
claims. This broad preemptive effect is considered to obstruct state
health insurance reform and innovation. HIPAA, by contrast, does not
expressly preempt state regulation or occupy the field but merely limits
certain insurer practices for certain insureds, setting a federal floor.321
With respect to regulation of the individual insurance market, HIPAA
expressly allows states to establish alternative mechanisms for extending
access to insurance to individuals. All but ten states have established
alternative programs, including pre-ACA high-risk insurance pools. 32 2
318. See Pear,supra note 218 (noting that twenty states are prepared to run insurance pools
under the ACA).
319. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supranote 43, at 1301-03.
320. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheersfor Process Federalism,46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1385
(2001) ("[Preemption] ensur[es] that states retain something meaningful to do . . . .").
321. See Karen Pollitz et al., Early Experience with "New Federalism" in Health Insurance
Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFF. 7, 9 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/19/4/
7.full.pdf ("More protective state reforms (for example, shorter maximum preexisting condition
exclusion periods) and state laws beyond HIPAA's scope (for example, rating rules) are not
preempted if they do not prevent the application of HIPAA.").
322. See Kaiser Family Found., Non-Group Coverage Rules for HIPAA Eligible Individuals,
2010, STATE STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?cat-7&
ind=356 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
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HIPAA's relatively narrow preemptive effect was largely accepted
without state objection.323 Thus, contrary to uncooperative federalism's
doctrinal suggestion that narrow preemption will produce more friction
and dialogue, whereas broad preemption will marginalize dissenting
views, those examples suggest the opposite.
It is also possible that states will not object to the new federal
insurance market reforms at all, despite the intrusion on traditional state
,,324
states may find that
sovereignty. Acknowledging their "two masters,
the public favors those consumer-protective reforms, addressing some of
the most notorious abuses of the commercial insurance industry.3 25 At
the same time, states can pass the blame onto the federal government if
insurance companies incorporated in their states or other interested
constituents object to the new requirements. Uncooperative federalism
values accountability,3 26 yet states may be strategically hiding behind the
federal preemptive cloak to both silently support new laws popular with
insureds and to avoid taking responsibility for laws objectionable to
insurers. This analysis comports with opportunistic federalism: states
raise federalism objections to advance certain objectives but accept
federal control when other goals are paramount. 327
E. IndividualMandate
The provision of ACA that has drawn the strongest, most persistent
objection from states is the least intrusive on states' authority. Many
states vehemently protest the mandate that every individual maintain
health insurance.3 28 The individual mandate, however, requires nothing
particular of states and will be implemented and administered entirely by
federal authorities. 329
Before and after ACA's passage, lawmakers in over forty states
passed, introduced, or advocated state constitutional amendments or
legislative resolutions, providing that individuals within the state shall
not be required to participate in a particular health plan or prohibited
from purchasing medical care directly from health care providers. 3 30 The
323. See Pollitz et al., supra note 321, at 15-16 (describing delayed implementation in three
states, Missouri, Rhode Island, and California, largely due to resource limitations).
324. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1270.
325. See SiCKO (Dog Eat Dog Films 2007) (documenting the complaints about the U.S. health
insurance industry).
326. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1289-91.
327. See supranotes 93-119 and accompanying text.
328. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a), 124 Stat.
119, 242-44 (2010).
329. Id. sec. 1501, §5000A(g), 124 Stat. at 249.
330. See, e.g., Ariz. Sec'y of State, An Initiative Measure 1 (proposed Nov. 4, 2008), available
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nullification resolutions, modeled on the American Legislative
Exchange Council's ("ALEC's") Freedom of Choice in Health Care
Act, 3 3 1 aim squarely at ACA's requirement to maintain individual health
insurance. The current state proposals are ALEC's second-generation
model laws. First-generation state nullification laws opposed a national
health plan or mandatory public option, 332 proposals which were never
seriously considered with ACA.
Under ACA, beginning in 2013, U.S. citizens and legal residents
must maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage.333 The
individual mandate can be satisfied with coverage under Medicare,
Medicaid, CHIP, veterans' health care programs, or the Peace Corps
volunteers' health plan. 33 4 Coverage under an eligible employersponsored plan, a plan offered in the individual market, or a
grandfathered health plan will also suffice. 3 35 Individuals will be
required to report their coverage status on their annual federal income
taxes, and failure to maintain coverage will result in monetary
penalties.336 The penalty for the first year, 2014, is a very modest $95.
At full implementation, the penalty is $695 per year, up to a maximum
of three times that amount ($2085), or 2.5% of household income,
whichever is greater. 3 The law provides exemptions based on religion,
unlawful presence within the United States, incarceration, 3 39 inability to
afford coverage,340 hardship, membership in an Indian tribe, coverage
for more than nine months of the year, 34 1 and taxable income below the
federal filing threshold.34 2

at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2008/info/pubpamphlet/english/Propl01.htm ("No law shall be
passed that restricts a person's freedom of choice of private health care systems or private plans of
any type[,]interferes[] with a person's or entity's right to pay directly for lawful medical services[,]
nor impose a penalty or fine, of any type, for choosing to obtain or decline health care coverage or
for participating in any particular health care system or plan.").
331. See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, ALEC's Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act: How Your
State Can Protect Patients' Rights, ALEC, http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?SectionALEC sFreedom ofChoiceinHealthCareActi &Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay
.cfm&TPLID=29&ContentlD=l 3527 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
332. See Jost, supranote 35, at 869-70.
333. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 1501, § 5000A(g), 124 Stat. at 249.
334. Id. sec. 1501, § 5000A(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 248.
335. Id. sec. 1501, § 5000A(f)(l)(B)-(D), 124 Stat. at 248.
336. See id. sec. 1501, §5000A(b)(l)-(2), 124 Stat. at 244.
337. See id. sec. 1501, §5000A(c)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 245.
338. See id. sec 1501, § 5000A(c)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 245, amended by Health Care and
Reconciliation Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1002(a)(l)-(2), 124 Stat. 1029, 1032.
339. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, sec. 1501, §5000A(d), 124 Stat. at 246.
340. Id. sec. 1501, § 5000A(e)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 246-47.
341. Id. sec. 1501, §5000A(e)(3), 124 Stat. at 247.
342. Id. sec. 1501, §500OA(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 247.
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To assist individuals in complying with the mandate, ACA provides
premium assistance federal tax credits for eligible taxpayers. 3 43 Also,
individuals with incomes above 100% but below 400% FPL are eligible
for federal subsidies for beneficiary cost-sharing under certain plans
purchased through the Exchanges.34 4 The federal government will
inform insurers that an individual is eligible for cost-sharing
reductions 345 and then remit periodic and timely payments to the insurer
to make up the premium difference. 346
The policy goal of the individual health insurance mandate is to
bring more people into the insurance market, including healthy
individuals who often elect not to purchase health insurance, thereby
spreading the risks more broadly and making insurance more affordable
for all. 347 Opponents invoke libertarian values and free market
principles, objecting to a law that requires individuals to spend their own
money on particular transactions or engage in particular conduct. 3 4 8 The
insurance mandate arguably intrudes on economic freedom to decline
health insurance and personal autonomy rights to arrange and pay for
medical care other than through third-party insurers, without government
intrusion. More particularly, opponents of the individual mandate prefer
a system in which each pays for his own medical costs, rather than
effectively requiring healthy people to subsidize unhealthy people
through insurance risk pools. 3 49 In sum, the state nullification resolutions
opposing the federal individual insurance mandate speak more in the
language of individual than states' rights. 3o

343. Id. sec. 1401, § 36B(b), 124 Stat. at 213-14.
344. Id. § 1402(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 221 (creating a sliding scale for incomes between 100% and
400% of the federal poverty level).
345. See id. § 1402(a), 124 Stat. at 220-21.
346. See id. § 1402(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 222.
347. Id. § 1501(a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. at 243 ("By significantly increasing health insurance
coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse
selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower
health insurance premiums.").
348. See PETER URBANOWICZ & DENNIS G. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN
"INDIVIDUAL MANDATE" IN HEALTH CARE REFORM, THE FEDERALIST Soc'Y (2009),
7
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090 10_IndividualMandates.pdf (noting that individual mandates

may clash with the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause).
349. See MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INST., ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MANDATES: COMPULSORY
HEALTH INSURANCE IS A GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER 1, 9-10 (2009).
350. See, e.g., Virginia Complaint, supra note 18, at 4-6 (arguing that individual mandate

exceeds congressional

power to regulate interstate commerce, operating as regulation of

individuals' non-commercial conduct); Rivkin & Casey, supra note 28; George F. Will, Unlawful
Health Reform?, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2009, at A27 (noting arguments based on individual rights
and personal autonomy).
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Because states have no particular role, servant or otherwise, to play
in implementing or enforcing the mandate, it is difficult to place those
objections within the uncooperative federalism model. ACA's individual
mandate does not solicit state cooperation or commandeer state officials.
The federal government does not depend on states to effect the
mandate. 3 5 1 The individual mandate relies negligibly on state
participation for implementation, imposing no additional burdens other
than existing obligations to coordinate Medicaid eligibility,3 S2 establish
state-based Exchanges,353 and maintain existing state licensing and
regulation of insurance companies offering qualified plans.354
Enforcement, exemptions, credits, and subsidies are tied to federal
individual income tax rules, which are enforced and administered by
federal authorities. 3 5 5 Moreover, the individual mandate is novel.356
States, therefore, are not integrated or imbedded in an existing regulatory
regime, which might give them a stronger voice in the policymaking
conversation. 5
States' successful challenge to the individual mandate in the Florida
lawsuit is not adequately explained as uncooperative federalism. Their
winning theories were that the individual mandate exceeds congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce 35 8 and, furthermore, falls outside
of the necessary and proper authority. 359 Those are structural arguments
about the proper scope of federal enumerated powers in relation to state
reserved powers, not objections deriving from states' subservient posture
with respect to federal policies.
Accordingly, opportunistic federalism offers a more plausible
explanation for state resistance to the individual mandate, but it
inaccurately characterizes state opposition. Opportunistic federalism
posits that arguments about allocation of power are merely proxies for

351. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1266 ("States ... wield power against a
federal government that depends on them to administer its programs.").
352. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
354. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1301(a)(1)(C)(i),
124 Stat. 119, 162 (2010).
355. See id. sec. 1501, §500OA(f), 124 Stat. at 248-49 (noting that the government will
evaluate whether or not an individual has maintained minimum essential coverage pursuant to their
tax return).
356. See Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *71 (noting Congressional Research
Service and Congressional Budget Office conclusions that the individual health insurance mandate
is "'novel' and .'unprecedented').
357. See id. at 1268-70 (discussing the theory of integration and observing that servants' power
may also derive from integration).
358. See Florida Summary Judgment, supranote 30, at *104.
359. See Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *116.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss1/7

48

Leonard: Rhetorical Federalism: The Value State-Based Dissent to Federal H

2010]

RHETORICAL FEDERALISM

159

objections to substantive policies.360 It may well be that sponsors of state
nullification amendments and resolutions would readily abandon their
announced structural preferences if the individual insurance mandate
were otherwise repealed. 36 1 But even if repeal of ACA is the first-order
priority, it is nevertheless significant that states' objections are grounded
in the rhetoric of federalism. Indeed, structural federalism arguments
carried the day in the Florida lawsuit. 3 62
Initially, states opposing the individual mandate positioned
themselves as advocates for their citizens' individual rights, consistent
with the dual sovereignty 363 and, especially, new federalism themes. 36 4
The purported state interest is the discretion to recognize more liberal
individual economic and personal autonomy rights for their citizens
under states' reserved powers than the federal constitutional
minimum.365 The Virginia lawsuit asserts state standing based on its
particular sovereign interest in enforcing the recently enacted Virginia
Health Care Freedom Act, against ACA's directly conflicting
requirement.366 The Florida lawsuit asserted injury broadly to the states'
sovereign interests as "protectors of the freedom, public health, and
welfare of their citizens and residents."3 67 The Complaint alleged that
the individual mandate is an unconstitutional tax that injures states'
"exclusive authority, except to the extent permitted by the federal
government by the Constitution, to make all taxing decisions affecting
their citizens."368 Precisely striking a new federalism chord, the Plaintiff
States claimed the exclusive authority, "to confer a right upon persons in
their states to make health care decisions without government
interference." 36 9
Opportunistic federalism dismisses that new federalism posture as
yet another disingenuous line of argument.370 But opportunistic
federalism fails to explain why states, rather than individuals, led the
360. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
361. See Devins, supra note 44, at 134 ("[T]he willingness of lawmakers and interest groups to
manipulate federalism in order to secure preferred substantive policies is the rule.").
362. See Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *6-11 (framing decision in federalist
rhetoric and principles).
363. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of dual
sovereignty).
364. See supranotes 126-35 and accompanying text (discussing new federalism principles).
365. See Virginia Complaint, supranote 18, at 5-7; Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 19.
366. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 2010); Virginia Complaint, supra note 18, at
1-2,6.
367. See Florida Complaint, supra note 18, at 16.
368. Id. at 17-18.
369. Id. at 18.
370. See Ryan, supra note 93, at 600-01.
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charge against the individual mandate. If opportunistic federalism is
correct in suggesting that the public does not really care about or
understand 3 7 1 the allocation of power between states and the federal
government, 3 72 it is hard to explain why state-oriented challenges have
been at the center of the debate over the individual mandate. Libertarian,
free market, individual rights arguments seem much more accessible and
likely to resonate with the public. Moreover, individual citizens or public
interest groups representing individuals have stronger standing to
challenge the law. Judge Vinson's holding that the Plaintiff States had
standing to pursue the constitutional challenge depended on the presence
of two individual citizens, a small-business owner and an uninsured
retiree, and two states, Utah and Idaho, which recently enacted state
health reform nullification laws, among the group of plaintiffs. The
persistence of state-based challenges to the individual mandate suggests
that structural concerns are more meaningful to the public than
opportunistic federalism acknowledges.
To summarize, state responses to ACA provisions can be mapped
as follows:
Table 3
STATES' ROLE
Rivals/challengers

Power of the sovereign
1. State autonomy; dual
sovereignty

Power of the servant
2. Uncooperative
federalism

Individual Mandate

Medicaid expansion
High-risk pools

Allies/friends

3. Functional theory

4. Cooperative federalism

High-risk pools

Exchanges
Insurance market reforms

The provisions that have drawn the loudest objections and
challenges from states include Medicaid expansion, high-risk pools, and
the individual mandate. Medicaid expansion and high-risk pool
objections fit within uncooperative federalism, Box 2, to the extent that
371. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 97, at 90 ("Because of their rational ignorance of
public policy, citizens will not consistently protect federalism, particularly because . . . [it] lacks
political salience . . . .").
372. See id at 96 ("Federalism questions are unusually complex because they involve a wide
range of policy areas and complicated intergovernmental relations. . .
373. See Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *34-37.
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the federal government is seeking to enlist states as servants. But
uncooperative federalism is an inaccurate label because states seem
powerless as servants to improve federal-state relations and
policymaking. States' responses to the high-risk pools may fit the
functional theory, Box 3, as states seem to have freely bargained for use
or denial of state administrative capacity to establish the pools. The
individual mandate does not call for state cooperation or implementation
and thus falls outside the "power of servant" column, fitting best under
state autonomy or dual sovereignty, Box 1. For now, states are actively
preparing to establish state-based Exchanges and have not objected to
extensive new federal health insurance market reforms, placing those
two provisions in cooperative federalism, Box 4. In sum, state responses
fall across the matrix and cannot be completely explained by
uncooperative federalism.
Nor do states' reactions comport entirely with opportunistic
federalism because states' appeals to structural federalism, in some
cases, seem earnest. For example, states' objections to Medicaid
expansion and high-risk pools invoke legitimate concerns about the
budgetary and administrative burdens. Support for state-based
Exchanges, the congressionally preferred approach, is consistent with
state autonomy or dual sovereignty views. States' tolerance for federal
preemption of state insurance regulation, however, does appear
opportunistic inasmuch as that position compromises state autonomy in
favor of politically popular consumer protection provisions. State-based
dissent to the individual mandate resonates with new federalism themes,
which may be earnest or opportunistic. My theory of rhetorical
federalism encompasses the range of opportunistic and earnest
invocations of federalism and offers the normative conclusion that both
can be beneficial to the health reform conversation and federal-state
relations.3 74
V.

RHETORICAL FEDERALISM INHEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING

The persistence and pervasiveness of state resistance to recent
federal health reform legislation warrants attention. It is easy to dismiss
the nullification movement as nothing more than Tea Party
obstructionism and partisan politics designed to undermine the hardfought reforms. It is hard to take seriously state statutes and
constitutional amendments proclaiming that federal laws do not operate
within state borders. It is difficult to give much credence to states'

374. See supra Table 2 (placing rhetorical federalism in a two-by-two matrix).
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objections to federal commandeering under new Medicaid requirements
when they otherwise willingly allow federal authorities to set up
administrative shop inside their borders and broadly preempt state
regulatory authority. State litigants raise novel constitutional challenges
to the constitutionality of one of ACA's key provisions.
Uncooperative federalism gives states too much credit for their
various forms of dissent, while opportunistic federalism gives them too
little credit for caring about the constitutional allocation of power.
Bridging the two ideas, rhetorical federalism recognizes that even
inconsistent, disingenuous invocation of federalism arguments may
benefit both health care decisionmaking and federal-state relations. Like
uncooperative federalism, rhetorical federalism finds value in states not
simply falling in line with federal authorities. And like opportunistic
federalism, rhetorical federalism acknowledges that federalism
arguments have political salience aside from earnest concerns about the
federal structure. Rhetorical federalism encompasses various principles,
values, and slogans, and makes space for the discordant range of highly
vocal to mild objections, as well as conspicuous non-objections.376 The
health reform debate reveals a mix of deep concern for state autonomy
and tolerance for central direction.3 77
This Article draws attention on the tendency of the current health
reform conversation to stir up federalism values or sentiments.
Rhetorical federalism, the theory that I offer to describe the current
climate, is the highly public, highly vocal invocation of states' rights
arguments to frame objections to comprehensive, sea-changing federal
policies. I suggest that state-based resistance, whether motivated by
earnest concerns about structural allocation of power or naked desire for
political gain, can be valuable for a number of reasons.
First, rhetorical federalism brings transparency to the challenges of
implementing a complex, multi-faceted package of reforms. Often, the
general public, aside from motivated special interest groups, may be
unaware and, therefore, not particularly involved with, the
administrative rulemaking process and other implementation details
behind federal legislation. 37 8 Persistent state challenges reveal those
375. But see Florida Summary Judgment, supra note 30, at *76 (rejecting defendants'
argument that the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause challenge should fail because the asserted distinction
between "activity" and "inactivity" is "'novel' and "'unprecedented').
376. See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms,Similar Flaws: Constructinga New Approach
to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 204 (1996)
("[F]ederalism rhetoric ... justiflies] often disparate and inconsistent approaches.").
377. See id. at 204 (characterizing President Ronald Reagan's approach).
378. See Karl S. Coplan, IdeologicalPlaintiffs,Administrative Law Making, Standing, and the
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 393-94 (2009) ("[T]he agency legislative process is subject to
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mechanisms at work. ACA will gradually roll out over an elaborate
timeline established in the statute.379 Because ACA heavily employs
states as regulatory partners in implementing the comprehensive package
of reforms, states will remain especially attuned to the law's impact.
Each new call for state cooperation can be expected to give rise to
another round of state resistance. 380 As the uncooperative federalism
theory suggests, that ongoing tension between states and the central
government may be part of a "well-functioning federal system."
Ongoing state dissent can increase public understanding of, or at least
appreciation for, the challenges that lie ahead. The public will be
regularly reminded of the law's price tag and asked to consider the
government's ever-increasing role in health care delivery. Increased
attention to the particulars of ACA implementation, particularly states'
roles, can address accountability problems otherwise associated with
cooperative federalism arrangements.382 Highly vocal, public statements
by states, refusing federal requests for cooperation, helps to clarify lines
of accountability, even if states ultimately agree to participate.
Rhetorical federalism also serves to educate the electorate on
particular features of the comprehensive act by distilling it down to
discrete issues. Post-enactment polling demonstrates that citizens'
understanding of the details of ACA increased in the months that
followed its passage.
Polls also demonstrate that public support for
discrete components of ACA is stronger than for the legislation as a
whole. 3 84 One interpretation of those data is that the law is simply too
influence by organized interest groups.").
379. See Kaiser Family Found., Implementation Timeline, HEALTH REFORM SOURCE,
http://healthreform.kff.org/timeline.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
380. See Hills, Federalism,supra note 52, at 193 ("[Ajutonomous state and local politicians
can be an insufferable thorn in Congress' side . . . ."); supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text
(predicting that resistance to state Exchanges, similar to state high-risk pools, will arise as the
implementation date approaches).
381. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) ("By forcing state governments to
absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress
can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the
solutions . . ."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[W]here the Federal
Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished."); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1260, 1296.
382. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supranote 43, at 1289.
383.

See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 1 (2010) [hereinafter

KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL], available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8075-F.pdf
(showing decreased confusion from April to May 2010, two months after enactment); KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL (2010) [hereinafter KAISER SENIOR TRACKING

POLL], available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8082-F.pdf (tracking senior's awareness
of health reform components).
384. See generally KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, supra note 383, at 7 (tracking public
reaction to specific proposals, compared to overall legislation).
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long and complex to be well understood, even by the elected
representatives who enacted it, much less the general public. But recent
studies show a growing understanding of the new law.3 1 Ongoing, postenactment state resistance to each provision of ACA that rolls out should
continue to inform the public about the new law in more digestible bites.
States' very active role in the health reform debate is also valuable
in giving voice to minority views that may not be heard in national
debates. Our system of representative government envisions that
individual constituents will share their concerns and objections with
locally elected senators and representatives, who then carry those views
into the federal forum. 386 But when Congress and the White House are
in the same party control, dissenting views may not be heard outside of
state-level politics. 387 Accordingly, states serve as the "fourth branch" of
government. 8 8 Even if Washington's political power is more evenly
divided, state governments allow alternative fora for citizen participation
in the political process. State legislatures may be more accessible and
responsive to constituents' concerns than Congress. 38 9 Local
representatives also may embrace particular values and priorities of their
communities, which may not be shared by the entire nation. 390 Different
territories may have different tastes and needs, especially on social
385. See id.
386. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (noting that,
although there has been changes in the federal-state relationship since the inception of the nation,
the fundamental relationship between the federal government and the state government still exists);
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176-81 (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting

the PoliticsBack into the Safeguards ofFederalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 279 (2000).
387. See Young, supra note 37, at 1286 ("[Tlhe party that is 'out' in Washington will almost
certainly be 'in' in at least a couple of dozen states and literally thousands of localities . . . .").
388. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1285; Hills, Federalism,supranote 52, at
182 ("In effect, state and local governments serve as a kind of 'fourth branch' of the federal
government, even more so than so-called independent federal regulatory agencies.").
389. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 575 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Framers recognized that
the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of government, where people with firsthand
knowledge of local problems have more ready access to public officials. . . ."); Amar, Five Views,
supra note 55, at 1234 ("[F]ederalism operates to edify and engage the citizenry."); Chemerinsky,
supra note 56, at 527 ("[A] frequently invoked value of federalism is that states are closer to the
people and thus more likely to be responsible to public needs and concerns."); Grey, supra note 56,
at 511 (noting that federalism values local politicians as they are more responsive than Congress to
the concerns of the citizenry).
390. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 965-66
(1983) (suggesting that state constitutional interpretation should consider the state's "peculiarities");
Peter D. Jacobson, The FederalistApproach to Health Care and Its Limitations: Introductory
Remarks, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y, at v, xii (2007) ("The individual states are closer to the
people, and hence better equipped to reflect their plurality of values."); Schapiro, supra note 129, at
403 (discussing the position that state constitutional interpretation should rely on distinctive
attributes of the state).
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policy matters. 3 9 1 The diversity of approaches creates a political
marketplace, allowing citizenry a choice rather than a one-size-fits-all
approach to policymaking.392
Not only do states represent the diverse preferences of their
citizens, but also state representatives may be in a better position to
make those preferences known. Framing objections to substantive
polices in terms of states' rights, even when state interests seemingly are
not implicated, vocalizes constituents' views on the merits of the new
federal law. State officials, including members of Congress, state
legislators, attorneys general, and insurance commissioners, are more
politically connected and may have stronger voices in the national
dialogue than any individual voter.393 One of the values identified with
uncooperative federalism is the ability of states to express dissenting
views of their constituents from a more advantageous, insider status. 3 9 4
At the same time, state politicians garner support from voters who
oppose the law, consistent with opportunistic federalism's
396
395
and
uncooperative federalism's two masters notion,
observations,
the federalist design itself.397
Another value of rhetorical federalism is codifying dissent, my
original working thesis, when I predicted modest, if any reforms, would
pass.398 Although sweeping legislation was enacted, there is movement
afoot to repeal particular provisions or the entire ACA statute.399 With
many of ACA's key provisions not taking effect for several years4 00 and
391. See Weil & Tallon, supra note 57, at 690 ("[S]tate policies can be more closely tailored to
local economic conditions and can reflect local values . . . .").
392. See Amar, Five Views, supra note 55, at 1236-37; Young, supra note 58, at 54 ("[T]he
best way to please more of the people more of the time is to offer a choice of regulatory regimes.").
393. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1268-70; Young, supra note 37, at 1285
("Individuals are often ineffective speakers when they act alone .... [O]ften the most effective
organizations for organizing and transmitting dissent are themselves governmental institutions.").
394. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supranote 43, at 1288-89.
395. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussing McGinnis and Somin's
thesis).
396. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 43, at 1270-71.
397. See Young, supra note 37, at 1285-86 (suggesting that it was the Founders' intention that
state and local politicians would convey the dissenting opinions of their constituents).
398. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
399.

See REPUBLICANS IN CONG.,

A PLEDGE TO AMERICA 25-28 (2010), available at

http://pledge.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/solutions/a-pledge-to-america.pdf; Robert Lowes,
House Votes to Repeal Healthcare Reform Law, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWs (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/735967; Felicia Sonmez, Senate Defeats Republican-Led
Health-CareRepeal Effort, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/
02/senate-debates-health-care-rep.html.
400. See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 379 (noting that several of the ACA's provisions
will not go into effect for several years); Mark Murray, NBC/WSJ Poll: GOP Poised for Big
Midterm Gains, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 20, 2010, 8:04 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39748015/
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midterm elections bringing a shift in congressional power, 4 0 1 the
legislation remains vulnerable. State nullification laws, even if legally
null as a matter of federal supremacy,4 02 serve to codify dissent and
avoid the "Groundhog Day" repetition of failed proposals that tend to
bog down health reform debates.4 03 State constitutional amendments and
legislative resolutions may capture the popular opinion that particular
approaches, whether universal health care, a public option, or an
individual mandate, will be political non-starters. Perhaps then the
debate can move past those proposals toward more likely consensus.
Health reform nullification amendments and resolutions, even if
legally unenforceable, may serve a valuable expressive function by
codifying state values and opinions. The laws are similar to state
constitutional provisions that proclaim health as a fundamental right or
public concern, 4 0 4 anti-abortion trigger laws, 4 0 5 or constitutional
"directive principles."40 6 Those laws do not give rise to individually

ns/politics-decision_2010/.
401. See Peter Baker & Carl Hulse, Deep Rifts Divide Obama and Republicans, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2010, at Al (reporting that Republicans gained control in the House and describing the
midterm elections as "the biggest swing since the 1948 election under Harry S. Truman").
402. See Jost, supra note 35, at 869 (evaluating the legality of state nullification laws).
403. See David A. Hyman, The MassachusettsHealth Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2007) ("In Groundhog Day, Bill Murray is forced to live the same
day over and over again. The debate over the uninsured has had a similar feel for the past several
decades." (footnote omitted)); see also Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Reform-Why So Much Talk
and So Little Action?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 208, 208 (2009) ("[S]everal previous presidents have
attempted to enact some kind of national health insurance: Harry Truman in the 1940s, Richard
Nixon in the 1970s, and most recently Bill Clinton in the 1990s. These attempts went nowhere.");
Jonathan Oberlander, Great Expectations-The Obama Administration and Health Care Reform,
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 321, 322 (2009) ("Obama's health plan (as outlined during the campaign)
clearly embodies additional lessons from the Clinton reform debacle . . . .").
404. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1348, 1350, 1359 (2010) (discussing state laws which cite health as a
public concern).
405. See William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1918-20 (1993); Matthew Berns,
Note, Trigger Laws, 97 GEO. L.J. 1639, 1640-42 (2009) (explaining that trigger laws are presently
unconstitutional substantive provisions that are designed to come into effect if there is a change in
constitutional law that would make the provision enforceable).
406. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 37 ("The provisions contained in this Part [IV] shall not be
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
govemance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making
laws."); IR. CONST., 2004, art. 45 ("The principles of social policy. . .are intended for the general
guidance of the Oireachtas. The application of those principles . .. shall not be cognizable by any
Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution."); CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §§ 1324 (listing the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy); see also Althouse,
supra note 38, at 1254-55 (discussing a municipal resolution asserting its own constitutional
commentary); Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeabilityof ConstitutionalBorders, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1763, 1770 (2004) (describing India and Ireland's directive principles).
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enforceable rights but operate as conspicuous expressions of preferences
or guiding principles. Similarly, state laws purporting to nullify the
federal individual insurance mandate may be understood as expressions
of broad public sentiment that health is a matter of individual, not
government, responsibility. 40 7 Even if laws such as Virginia's 4 0 8 are
deemed legally null and preempted by ACA, they nevertheless have
rhetorical value in memorializing citizens' preferences.
Another value of rhetorical federalism may be repackaging the
health reform debate in politically neutral language, thereby
depoliticizing highly charged issues and overcoming voter fatigue.
Objections based on the Tenth Amendment or state autonomy grounds
suggest no partisan preference or view on the underlying substantive
policies. By framing objections to ACA as concern for the allocation of
power within the federal system, dissenters may more effectively capture
the public's attention. Congressional and public debates over ACA were
long, bitter, and highly charged. Even if opportunistic federalism is
accurate in suggesting that opponents do not particularly care about
structure of government, federalism slogans provide seemingly neutral
grounds for objecting to controversial political issues, such as health
care rights and the role of government in health care decisionmaking. In
addition, ACA opponents may gain credibility by rising above the fray,
objecting on seemingly principled, even patriotic, 4 09 rather than political,
grounds. Federalism rhetoric is beneficial in recapturing the public's
attention and keeping it engaged in the ongoing consideration of
fundamental values and policies.
Finally, rhetorical federalism highlights the increased government
involvement in health care delivery, renewing deliberation about the
appropriate role of states in federal policymaking and government in
individuals' lives. Federalism slogans enliven the ongoing debate over
deep ideological and constitutional issues regarding personal autonomy,
government responsibility, and health care rights. Even when opponents
adopt inconsistent positions, the health reform nullification movement,
for all its distractions, persistently impresses those issues on the
electorate. "There is no need for a single coherent problematic to
dominate; a movement might successfully force a conflicting set of

407. See, e.g., Young, supra note 37, at 1298-99 (arguing that a state law, that would be
preempted by federal law, can be a form of political expression).
408. See VA. CODE ANN. §38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 2010).
409. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 906 (1994) ("We Americans love federalism .... It conjures up
images of Fourth of July parades down Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family farms with
tire swings in the front yard.").
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issues onto the center of the nation's political consciousness." 4 10 The
state nullification movement demands that we consider, and reconsider,
our deeply held views on rights and responsibility, the role of
government, and state identity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article considers the rhetorical value of federalism in health
care decisionmaking. We are in the very early stages of ACA
implementation; thus, any assessment of the impact of the ongoing
nullification movement is necessarily predictive. With that caveat in
mind, this Article offers a novel affirmative take on the seemingly
distracting and destructive trend of state resistance to federal health
reform. My notion of rhetorical federalism draws on previously
articulated federalism theories, recognizing, like uncooperative
federalism, that dissent can be productive, and, like opportunistic
federalism, that state objections may be pretextual. Federalism values
are not easily defined and are the subject of widely varying opinions.
Likewise, sweeping health reform legislation like ACA relies on an
array of approaches and strategies, each particular provision of which
invites different reactions. The debate over health reform, not
surprisingly, places issues of individual rights and the role of
government in health care at the center of politics. The national
conversation also has the perhaps unexpected effect of placing the
ancillary issue of allocation of power between the central government
and the sovereign states squarely before the electorate.

410.

Ackerman, supra note 138, at 1519.
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